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Can Civil Gang Injunctions Change Communities?

A Community Assessment of the Impact of Civil Gang Injunctions

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Table of Contents

Abstract	iv
Executive Summary	v
Acknowledgements	xiv
List of Tables and Figures	xv
I. Background and Research Objectives	1
A. Civil Gang Injunctions (CGI)	1
B. History of Development and Expanded Use of Injunctions	3
C. Logic Model: How CGIs Might Reduce Gang Activity	4
D. Prior Research on the Impact of CGIs	6
E. Objectives of This Research	7
F. Site Selection Activities	7
II. Local Research Context	
A. San Bernardino as Research Site	9
<i>Overview</i>	9
<i>Demographic and social profile</i>	10
<i>Public perception of the city of San Bernardino</i>	11
<i>Target site selection</i>	11
B. History of Other San Bernardino CGIs	12
C. Flats Injunction: Chronology and Implementation	14
III. Survey Methods	
A. Research Design	18
B. Area Descriptions	19
C. Measures	24
<i>Measures of immediate outcomes</i>	25
<i>Measures of intermediate outcomes</i>	25
<i>Long-term outcomes</i>	26
<i>Knowledge and attitudes towards gangs and injunctions</i>	26
<i>Pilot survey instruments</i>	27
D. Survey Procedures	27
<i>Survey mode and bias</i>	27
<i>Hybrid model</i>	28
<i>Sampling</i>	28
E. Field Staff Recruitment, Training and Supervision	30

F. Response Rates and Comparison of the Two Samples	31
<i>Comparison of Wave 1 sample to 2000 Census</i>	34
G. Data Analysis Plan	36
H. Plausibility of Methodological Artifacts	36
IV. Results	
A. Immediate Outcomes	39
B. Intermediate Outcomes	40
C. Long-term Outcomes	40
D. Attitudes and Knowledge of Gang and Injunctions	41
E. Qualifications to the Findings	42
V. Conclusions	43
A. Summary and Discussion of Findings	43
B. Study Limitations and Implications for Further Research	45
C. Study Implications for Gang Intervention	46
References	48
Appendix I	
Tables and Figures	
Appendix II	
Sample letters and postcards	
Wave 2 survey/interview instrument - English	
(with new questions added for second wave highlighted)	
Wave 2 survey/interview instrument - Spanish	
(with new questions added for second wave highlighted)	

Abstract

Research Goals and Objectives: This study evaluates the community impact of a locally popular gang intervention strategy, the Civil Gang Injunction, on neighborhood residents. Researchers predicted immediate and long-term effects on residents' perceptions and experience of crime, gang activity and neighborhood quality. The study results offer guidance for program development for practitioners contemplating use of this strategy.

The study surveyed 797 San Bernardino residents in five neighborhoods eighteen months prior and 1229 residents six months subsequent to the issuance of an injunction. Roughly two-thirds were Latino with the remainder equally distributed among other ethnic categories. All participants were adults; two-thirds were female.

Research Design and Methodology: Research hypotheses were tested with a before-after nonequivalent comparison group design with multiple comparisons. The injunction area was split in two by level of disorder. Two similarly disordered areas were compared. A third area with an injunction issued five years earlier was also studied.

A hybrid survey procedure was used. After five contacts to sampled addresses in support of the self-administered survey, trained field staff approached remaining addresses for a doorstep interview using the same protocol. Adjusted response rates were sixty-four percent for Wave 1 and seventy-three percent for Wave 2.

Differences in change over time in immediate, intermediate and long-term outcomes were compared by examining their interaction in an ANOVA. Supplemental analyses explored methodological artifacts arising from mode differences from the hybrid survey model and from variations in nonresponse rates during data collection, lending more confidence to the primary findings.

Research Results and Conclusions: Analyses indicated positive evidence of short-term effects in the primary injunction area, including less gang presence, fewer reports of gang intimidation and less fear of confrontation with gang members. The primary injunction area showed no significant changes in intermediate or long-term outcomes save lower fear of crime. Comparison of the new and old injunction areas suggested that improvements in neighborhood dynamics might accrue over the long term. Negative effects were observed in the secondary, less disordered injunction area.

This study suggests that strategic suppression of gang member activities may translate into modest immediate improvements in community safety and well-being. Further experimentation with Civil Gang Injunctions is recommended, with caution regarding the characteristics of the targeted gang and the geographic reach of the injunction. Effects might be substantially improved by coupling an injunction with efforts to improve neighborhood social organization and provide positive alternatives for gang members.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Civil gang injunction procedures—a process whereby selected gang members are prohibited from engaging in specified activities such as loitering at schools, carrying pagers and riding bicycles, or face arrest—have been heralded as an effective and innovative tool to combat street gang activity and to reduce the strangleholds that gangs can have on their communities. The Civil Gang Injunction (CGI) is an anti-gang strategy growing increasingly popular among law enforcement and public officials in Southern California. Despite this expansion, very little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy on reducing gang activity or improving traumatized neighborhoods. The National Institute of Justice awarded a grant to researchers at the University of Southern California to address this gap in research. This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the impact of one CGI, implemented in the Verdugo Flats neighborhood of San Bernardino, California, in the fall of 2002. The primary outcomes studied focus on changes in the quality of life in this neighborhood, rather than on the injunction's effects on the targeted gang or on official crime. The study's findings have clear implications for law enforcement agencies that anticipate using this strategy, for civil court judges that are asked to limit the activities of gang members to achieve more community order and for future research on program effectiveness.

Relevant theories in social psychology (i.e., small groups and social identity theory) and criminology (i.e., deterrence and social disorganization theory) predict a range of potential outcomes of CGIs. The community social disorganization perspective suggests that injunctions should improve patterns in community processes, such as neighborhood relationships, disorder and informal social control. Our evaluation addresses this type of community-level outcome, rather than the individual gang member outcomes suggested by deterrence and group identity theory. These latter effects may well be precursors to effects on community residents, but these are not captured by the research design of our study. The few evaluations of injunctions conducted to date consider the impact on criminal behavior; our study is the first to focus on neighborhood processes.

Accordingly, the conceptual basis for the evaluation presumes a direct—and untested—impact of the injunctions on gang activity. The more immediate, or proximal, effects on neighborhood residents should be observed in reduced gang visibility, graffiti, instances of gang intimidation and fear of gang victimization as well as increased police visibility. These benefits should result in reduced fear of crime more generally, crime victimization, and improved community order. Ultimately, residents in neighborhoods targeted by injunctions may experience increased neighborhood social cohesion and informal social control, more collective and neighborhood social efficacy, more willingness to call police in threatening situations and improved perceptions of police authority.

San Bernardino

To identify the optimal site for the study, we interviewed an officer from more than two dozen Southern California police agencies. These agencies reported both having significant gang

populations and using multi-agency collaborations to combat them on the 1998 National Youth Gang Survey of police. San Bernardino presented several advantages for the research. First, the San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) had already conducted three injunctions (against the Seventh Street gang in November 1997, Sur Crazy Ones in fall 1999, and one against prostitutes along a main boulevard) prior to our first contact with them (in spring 2000). Second, the gangs that they were considering for further injunctions seemed excellent targets for studying the impact on communities. Third, the department welcomed our inquiry and proved throughout to be very helpful in all regards.

San Bernardino is roughly sixty miles east of Los Angeles in the rapidly growing Inland Empire. In 2000, over 185,000 people lived in the city. While the city is part of one of the fastest expanding economic areas in Southern California, it is also home to a large number of poor minorities. Almost half of the population is Latino, roughly eighteen percent are African Americans, and just under thirty percent are white. More than one in five of the residents in this multicultural city was born outside the United States, with almost another twenty percent born outside of California. Over one-third of the population speaks only Spanish at home.

The city has been home to gangs for decades, and gangs have been expanding throughout the last one-third of a century. In spring 2000, SBPD was considering an injunction against the Delman Heights gang, with other gangs such as Five Times and Verdugo Flats in line thereafter. Ultimately, the department placed the Delman Heights injunction on hiatus (it was later filed in September 2003) and began focusing their attention on a possible injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang, leading us to select that area for our survey procedures.

Verdugo Flats Injunction

On August 5, 2002, the San Bernardino Police Department initiated implementation of a civil gang injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang as the result of the submission of a civil suit brought that day in the appropriate court. Earlier in the summer, five shootings and one assault occurred that suggested that the gang was actively defending its territory against a possible intrusion by an African American gang. The combination of heightened violence and the inter-racial nature of the gang fight led authorities to move to file the injunction.

Nineteen members of the gang were included in the injunction. Thirteen of the nineteen were in jail at the time of the injunction. Following a series of hearings, the court approved—instituting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on September 24, 2002—that these individuals were prohibited from twenty-two activities. Prohibited activities included behaviors associated with selling drugs, trespass, a nighttime curfew, public order offenses (fighting, drinking, urinating, littering, vandalism and graffiti) and public association with any other defendant.

SBPD believes that the Verdugo Flats claims as its territory a large swath of southwestern San Bernardino. It is a large, heavily Latino area that has been home to the gang since the 1970s. Officers report that the gang had roughly one hundred and fifty members as of August 2001, a twenty percent increase from two years before. They note repeatedly that Verdugo Flats is “turf-oriented,” claiming their area (the area in which the injunction was instituted) through extensive graffiti and intimidation of residents. The gang is split into three subgroups, VF Pear Street, VF

Congress Street, and VF Marijuanos, the later a term apparently used by the oldest of the gang members.

The original court date for consideration of the TRO was September 13, 2002, but two defendants requested and received a delay until September 24. The two defendants had asked for and received permission to associate with each other and other gang members during working hours, since a group that actively hired gang members employed them.

SBPD officials implemented the injunction using a standard set of procedures that they had developed in previous injunctions: enjoined individuals would be named at patrol meetings, photographs of the individuals would be placed on the wall of the room where patrol officers get their briefings and Metropolitan Enforcement Team (MET) officers would provide the primary enforcement for the injunction. As in earlier injunctions, the SBPD initiated a "sweep" of the injunction area right after they obtained the injunction. They searched homes of parolees and probationers and checked on outstanding warrants. They catalogued paraphernalia, photographs and clothing. They took the entire day to go through the target area.

Further, MET officers trained patrol officers in using the appropriate forms to arrest gang members on the injunction, and made sure that the in-house computer would notify patrol officers if an injunction member was stopped and identified. One police informant noted that he came in several times on his day off to work with patrol officers who had apprehended an enjoined individual.

From the inception of the Verdugo Flats CGI in September 2002 until January 2004, five individuals were arrested related to the injunction. Arrested individuals were liable for enhanced bail of up to \$25,000. The SBPD had previously used this technique, which means that arrested individuals could serve considerably more jail time.

Five months after the implementation of the injunction, we interviewed an officer partly responsible for the injunction's implementation about its success. He felt that the impact of the implementation had been dramatic. "The gang members were scared to come outside, scared to hang out together." And, "it is still working." He noted that graffiti and other signs of gang activity have declined dramatically. He pointed out that a wall near the park had graffiti 24/7, 365 days a year prior to the injunction, but not lately. Further, he heard from several community residents that they were glad that it had been done, they see the police more than before, and "keep up the good work."

Research Design and Methods

The consensus among the many police officers and attorneys involved in civil gang injunctions who were interviewed was that gang injunctions have an immediate impact on gang behavior. Gang members were less visible, stopped their intimidation, even disappeared altogether, relatively quickly after an injunction was filed. Consequently, we opted to time our second survey wave to test the impact of this immediate change in gang members' behaviors on neighborhood residents' attitudes and perceptions. We predicted that specific experiences of gang intimidation, fear of gang members, and visibility of the gang and graffiti would all

decrease within the first six months after the injunction and that the visibility of the police would increase. We also tested the impact on more intermediate outcomes: fear of crime, crime victimization and perceived level of social disorder. Long-term, gang injunctions were predicted to have a positive impact on aspects of community organization through neighborhood social networks and neighborhood collective action. We included survey measures of neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective efficacy, neighborhood efficacy, willingness to call the police and trust in the police, though we expected that these changes would evolve over a longer period of time.

To test our hypotheses about the immediate impact of the injunction on neighborhood residents, we chose a before-after nonequivalent comparison group design with multiple comparison groups. We planned to survey the residents of the Verdugo Flats injunction area as well as three different comparison areas approximately six months before the injunction and again approximately six months after the injunction. The comparison areas chosen were: 1) a highly disordered area with no territorial gang presence; 2) a gang area that has an active gang injunction filed three years before; and 3) a nearby area that was low in disorder. The three comparison neighborhoods were also chosen as possible sites for displaced Verdugo Flats gang activity after the injunction.

The first comparison would serve as a control for local factors other than the gang injunction that might cause shifts in the dependent variables across disordered neighborhoods in this section of the city over that time. The second comparison would provide an estimate of the level of fear and intimidation residents experience several years after a gang injunction. While it was too soon to expect much impact on community disorganization variables in the new injunction area, by Wave 2 the prior injunction area had had an active injunction for several years. If injunctions stimulate longer-term changes in community participation and organization, we predicted that this comparison area would be higher on these variables, especially in Wave 2, than the disorderly control and the Verdugo Flats injunction area. The third comparison area was originally conceptualized as a lower disorder area that would remain stable and would control for very broad trends in the city that affected residents' perceptions of safety.

Two changes in our original research design became necessary. First, the injunction was not filed until about eighteen months after the first survey. Second, the boundaries of the injunction area were drawn farther south than anticipated. Much of the less disorderly comparison area that we had surveyed in Wave 1 was now included within the injunction boundaries. For this reason, we split this area into two parts: creating a secondary injunction area that had relatively low disorder at the time of Wave 1 and the remaining low disorder comparison area. The remaining low disorder comparison area became a good control for the secondary injunction area, since the two were very similar at the time of the first survey.

Surveys were completed with 797 San Bernardino residents in five neighborhoods eighteen months prior and 1229 residents six months subsequent to the issuance of the injunction. Roughly two-thirds were Latino with the remainder equally distributed among other ethnic categories. All participants were adults; two-thirds were female. A hybrid survey procedure was used to promote response rates in these difficult-to-survey neighborhoods. After five contacts to sampled addresses in support of the self-administered survey, trained field staff approached

remaining addresses for a doorstep interview using the same protocol. Adjusted response rates were sixty-four percent for Wave 1 and seventy-three percent for Wave 2.

The primary hypotheses predicted that residents in the primary injunction area experienced a decrease (or less of an increase) from the first wave (before) to the second wave (after the injunction) on five immediate outcome variables relative to the high disorder comparison area. Differences in the change over time in these two areas were compared by examining their interaction in an ANOVA using wave and area as factors. Significant interactions in the predicted direction were interpreted as support for the primary hypotheses. These analyses were repeated comparing change in the secondary injunction area to change in its control, the low disorder comparison area. The same tests were repeated for the each of the intermediate and long-term outcomes, first between the two high disorder areas and then between the two low disorder areas.

For the next analyses, we assumed that residents in the two territorial gang neighborhoods that had injunctions were characterized by similar neighborhood experiences prior to implementation of the injunction. Both areas, as described by police informants, had been high crime, active gang territories. The levels of outcomes reported in the second wave of the survey were compared between the area that had now been under an injunction for five years and the primary, new injunction area that experienced an injunction just six months prior to Wave 2. It was expected that the long-term effects were unlikely to have developed in the recent injunction area, but would show some evidence of higher levels in the older injunction area. These effects were tested using t-tests and chi-square analyses.

Supplemental analyses explored methodological artifacts arising from mode differences from the hybrid survey model and from variations in nonresponse rates during data collection, lending more confidence to the primary findings.

Study Results

Notwithstanding the limitations of the study methods, our analyses provide evidence of the predicted short-term effects of a CGI on the primary neighborhood targeted. Consistent with police informants' reports of the implementation of the intervention, our surveys of community residents reveal positive evidence of implementation in the increased visibility of police patrols and in less gang presence in the neighborhood, as compared with changes in the primary control area. We estimate this translates into a net shift of about fifteen percent fewer respondents seeing gang members hanging out regularly and about nine percent more respondents seeing police patrolling in the primary injunction area relative to respondents in the disordered comparison area. Furthermore, fewer residents report acts of gang intimidation and residents report less fear of confrontation with gang members. We estimate a net shift of thirteen percent fewer respondents experiencing intimidation and twelve percent fewer respondents experiencing more than a little fear in the primary injunction area relative to its control. No differences in change in the presence of gang graffiti were detected.

Police reported no territorial gang presence in the primary comparison area, but residents there noted substantial gang activity in the baseline survey. As crime increased in the city over the

two-year period between the surveys, gang fear and intimidation increased in the disordered control area, but not in the neighborhood with the new injunction. The level of police patrol visibility remained stable in the new injunction areas, but decreased in all comparison areas. The increased relative commitment of police resources appeared to yield benefits to the primary injunction area: immediate benefits accrued to residents' experience of gang intimidation and fear of gangs.

These benefits to the primary injunction area, however, did not extend to the intermediate or long-term outcome indicators. Only in fear of crime did the primary injunction area show a relative decrease. No significant relative changes were observed on the other intermediate outcomes, perceived social disorder or crime victimization. On the long-term outcome indicators, we found little evidence that immediate effects on residents translated into larger improvements in neighborhood quality (i.e., neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective efficacy and police/community relationships), although reductions in fear of crime and gang visibility, fear and intimidation may be precursors to such change in the long run.¹

We found tantalizing hints of such changes in the comparison of the primary, new injunction area with a contiguous area in which an injunction had been implemented five years prior to the second survey. At the time of that survey, the two areas had similar levels of gang visibility, fear and intimidation, but the longstanding injunction area showed favorable levels of social cohesion, neighborhood and collective efficacy, and willingness to call the police if a gang member threatened residents. If we assume similarity between the two areas in these neighborhood characteristics at baseline prior to either injunction, these results are consistent with the view that community improvements will accrue once fear and intimidation are mitigated by the implementation of a civil gang injunction.

Taken together, these two sets of comparisons suggest that injunctions can have a positive impact on communities. This study design does not support strong causal inferences, but our findings lead to some speculation regarding processes of community change. This study did not assess the impact on the individual gang members named in this injunction—we have to presume that the reduced gang presence and intimidation perceived by the targeted community residents was the result of either deterrence and/or group identity processes spawned by the intervention. The unanticipated delay in obtaining the Verdugo Flats injunction precluded a strong test of long-term community effects, but the comparison between the two injunction communities is consistent with an interpretation of community change: willingness to engage with police in crime control efforts, a perspective that neighbors can and will intervene to resolve incipient crime problems and greater social bonds among neighbors.

The unexpected expansion of the territory covered by the Verdugo Flats injunction provided the opportunity to investigate the impact on a less disordered neighborhood, with considerably less gang activity. Our comparison of this secondary injunction area with a similarly low-disorder,

¹ These results were immune to several supplemental tests of methodological artifact. Although changes in gang fear were stronger among residents who were interviewed in person, the same trend was evident among those who self-administered the survey. Previous research would lead us to predict that people would downplay a sensitive issue like gang fear in a face-to-face interview setting. Overall, these additional methodological tests lend more confidence to these findings.

contiguous community produced results that caution those who would promulgate the efficacy of gang injunctions in diverse settings. Despite increased visibility of police patrols, the secondary injunction area evidenced negative impacts, relative to its control: more, not less, gang visibility, social disorder and property victimization, and less faith that a neighborhood can solve its own problems. There are at least four viable explanations for these findings.

First, negative results may reflect demographic shifts in the population of the secondary injunction area after the Wave 1 survey. Statistical controls for these demographic changes did not change our conclusions² but such transitions may foster neighborhood dynamics that increase gang activity, independent of intervention efforts. Second, as the police anticipated, this secondary injunction area may have been the locale for the displacement of gang activity from the primary injunction area, and the implementation of the intervention may have been weaker in this area. Third is the view that police over-reached by including this neighborhood with less gang activity and less social disorder in the injunction. Finally, these negative results may be a reflection of weaknesses in the study design or method that affected the secondary area comparisons in particular. These weaknesses, coupled with the distinct shift in the demographic profile of the secondary injunction area (i.e. more renters, less longevity in the neighborhood), make us particularly cautious about drawing broad generalizations about the negative outcomes detected in the secondary injunction area. On one hand, the results observed in the secondary injunction area may portend damaging effects of injunctions on certain types of communities or a displacement effect. On the other hand is the possibility that these results stem from methodological artifacts in the research process.

Implications for Research and Practice

Very little empirical research has been produced to investigate the impact of injunctions, despite their increasing popularity. This study is the first that examines potential effects on community residents. Future studies that replicate the essential method of this research are needed in a variety of contexts: different injunction forms and implementation procedures, different gang structures, different law enforcement and court venues and different community environments. Given the expanding interest in this type of intervention, it is striking that so little sound information is available regarding the effects on gang members or communities. A primary limitation of this study derives from its unique quality: any generalization of findings from one study of one injunction on one gang is clearly premature. The effects detected in this study reflect modest improvements in only the primary injunction area, and these may not be replicated in future studies.

The study design could be improved substantially by the inclusion of other data collection components, such as ethnography, structured interviews with gang members, and spatial analysis of crime data. Furthermore, an expanded longitudinal survey design is necessary to trace the long-term impacts of injunctions on community residents. The tenets of community social disorganization theory suggest that interventions like injunctions can produce positive community change and these must be measured over an extended period of time.

² The only difference was observed in the homeownership category on the intermediate outcome of perceived level of social disorder. The increase in social disorder in the low disorder area relative to the low disorder comparison area was observed only among renters.

Other study limitations derive from this research design. Our positive conclusions rest on differences detected between the primary injunction area and one similarly disordered comparison area. Visual inspection of the trends suggests that the observed differences were more the result of negative changes in the comparison area than positive changes in the injunction area. The neighborhood that was selected as a comparison area possibly suffered from situational or idiosyncratic assaults on community health. An optimal research design would include several comparison areas that mimicked the intervention area at the baseline survey point.

The civil gang injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang in San Bernardino appears to have decreased the visibility of gangs, episodes of gang intimidation, fear of gang confrontations and fear of crime in the targeted community. These effects are modest, but encouraging for practitioners wishing to experiment with this gang intervention strategy. Coupled with the findings from another study that found reductions in violent crime levels in injunction areas, this study suggests that strategic suppression of gang member activities may translate into modest improvements in community safety and well-being. We recommend further experimentation with this strategy, if such efforts are coupled with a program evaluation that continues to build on the assessment of the intervention's effects.

The study findings offer some guidelines for further refinement of the CGI strategy, and also recommendations for restraint or caution in some aspects. The negative results that emerged in the secondary injunction area argue for caution to be exercised in the determination of the geographic area to be covered by an injunction. Law enforcement and judicial practitioners should review spatial depictions of gang activity and crime to insure that the area within which individual conduct is to be constrained is limited to spaces most often frequented by gang members. There is no evidence that expanding the geographic reach of the injunction reduces the displacement of gang activity.

The Verdugo Flats gang—and most of the gangs included in prior studies of injunctions —is a traditional, territorial gang. This type of gang is assumed by practitioners to be most appropriate for injunctions, due to the geographic limitations imposed. Until more is known about the mechanisms whereby injunctions reduce gang activity, it is advisable to limit the strategy to the gang forms that have produced positive results thus far.

This study found tentative support for salutary injunction effects on community residents and neighborhoods. Theory and research on communities suggest that these effects could be substantially increased if injunction development and implementation engaged community residents in a process of neighborhood empowerment and improvement. Social networks and both formal and informal community organizations provide social capital through which neighborhoods can continue on a positive trajectory.

Finally, the positive effects of injunctions might be expanded if this strategy was coupled with the provision of skill-development and treatment resources for targeted gang members. The serving of injunction papers may open a window of opportunity for change. Offering a carrot of positive opportunity for vocational, educational or personal growth with the stick of promised

incarceration for violation of the injunction prohibitions may provide more immediate and long-lasting change in negative gang behavior than that obtained from an injunction implemented alone.

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During Wave 2, Clara Hyun managed the mailed survey returns and supervised the data entry and coding, and contributed to the data cleaning and preparation for analysis. In addition, undergraduate students Kristina Ferris, Janet Linnell, Theresa Page and Leah Sullett assisted her with data entry for Wave 2, while Guillermina Morena undertook the coding for Wave 1. USC SPPD graduate student Sagang Kim created the 2000 Census descriptions of the five study areas, in addition to creating the maps that accompany the text, at times under severe deadlines.

Without able field management, these surveys would not have reached the households in our study areas. USC SPPD graduate students Stacy Harwood (Wave 1) and Jami Young (Wave 2) oversaw the operations in San Bernardino. The field crew who delivered the surveys and later conducted the interviews consisted of Isela Apodaca, Ilayali Argüelles, Rene Cabral, Norma Camarena, Michael Flores, Imelda Fuentes, Juan Garcia, Oscar Garcia, Yolanda Gutierrez, Rachel Heredia, Yvette Lopez, Angelica Lozano, Shantal Marshall, Deborah Murguiá, Ramon Ortega, Lupe Paredes, Rosie Paredes-Williams, Celene Perez, Victor Polanco, René Robles, Anabell Rosa, Alex Ruiz, Rosalba Serrano, Veronica Serrano, Pedro Rivera and Joel Urquidez.

List of figures

Maps

1	City of San Bernardino in relation to other cities in California	9
2	Five Study Areas	20
3	Location of contacts with individuals cited in SBPD officer declarations of Flats Civil Gang Injunction	23

Tables

1	San Bernardino Territorial Civil Gang Injunctions, 1998-2003	13
2	Address Universe and Sample Numbers for Study Areas	29
3	Response Rates for Study Areas	31
4	Area Demographic Characteristics for Wave 1 and Wave 2	33
5	Area Demographic Characteristics Comparing Percentages, Census 2000 to Wave 1	35
6	Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two High Disorder Areas on the Immediate and Intermediate Outcomes	Appendix I
7	Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two Low Disorder Areas on the Immediate and Intermediate Outcomes	"
8	Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two High Disorder Areas on the Long-term Outcomes	"
9	Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two Low Disorder Areas on Long-term Outcomes	"
10	Means and Tests by Area Comparing Two High Disorder Injunction Areas on Wave 2 Proximal Outcomes	"
11	Means and Tests by Area Comparing Two High Disorder Injunction Areas on Wave 2 Distal Outcomes	"
12	Percent of R Who See a Change in Gang Activity NOW Relative to One Year BEFORE the Wave 2 Interview	"
13	Mean Agreement That a Gang Injunction Is a Good Way to Make Neighborhoods Safer	"

Figures

1	Proportion of Achieved Sample Surveyed Face-To-Face Each Survey Wave by Area	Appendix I
2	Frequency of Seeing Gang Members Hanging Out in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	"

3	Frequency of Seeing Police Officers Patrolling in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	Appendix I
4	Frequency of Seeing New Graffiti the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	" in
5	Percent of R Who Were Intimidated (Bullied, Hassled, Frightened, Made Anxious) by Gang Members in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	"
6	Level of Fear of Being Confronted by a Gang Member the Neighborhood over the Last Six Months	" in
7	Level of Fear of Crime in the Neighborhood the Last Six Months	" over
8	Perceived Social Disorder over the Last Six Months the Neighborhood (Average Frequency of 12 Items)	" in
9	Percent of R or Family Members Who Were Victims Violent Crime (or Attempted) in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	" of
10	Percent of R or Family Members Who Were Victims Property Crime (or Attempted) in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months	" of
11	Perceived Change in the Level of Gang Activities the Neighborhood NOW Relative to this Same Time a Year BEFORE Interview)	" in (Wave 2

We've been thanked by community members after every gang injunction. People are grateful to be free from fear of gang thugs and deterioration of their neighborhoods. Residents even report a turnaround in property values.

Michael Genelin, Head Deputy, Hardcore Gang Division
L.A. County District Attorney's Office
(Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1997)

I. Background and Research Objectives

Civil gang injunction procedures—a process whereby selected gang members are prohibited from engaging in specified activities such as loitering at schools, carrying pagers and riding bicycles, or face arrest—have been heralded as an effective and innovative tool to combat street gang activity and to reduce the strangleholds that gangs can have on their communities. The Civil Gang Injunction (CGI) is an anti-gang strategy growing increasingly popular among law enforcement and public officials in Southern California. Despite this expansion, very little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy on reducing gang activity or improving traumatized neighborhoods. The National Institute of Justice awarded a grant to researchers at the University of Southern California to address this gap in research. This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the impact of one CGI, implemented in the Verdugo Flats neighborhood³ of San Bernardino, California, in the fall of 2002. The primary outcomes studied focus on changes in the quality of life in this neighborhood, rather than on the injunction's effects on the targeted gang or on official crime. The study's findings have clear implications for law enforcement agencies that anticipate using this strategy, for civil court judges that are asked to limit the activities of gang members to achieve more community order and for future research on program effectiveness.

Prior to presenting these findings and their implications, we provide in this section a description of the CGI strategy and the prevalence of its use. We discuss the conceptual perspectives that suggest why CGIs might be an effective approach to addressing gang activity and its collateral effect on community quality of life. We also review the small body of prior research on injunctions. From this theory and prior research, we derived general research objectives. We conclude this introductory section of the report with a description of site selection activities. The remaining sections discuss the specific research context of San Bernardino and the injunction we studied, the research methods, evaluation findings and conclusions.

A. Civil Gang Injunctions

Our review of the practitioner literature and interviews with law enforcement gang specialists suggest that the CGI is a relatively flexible tool to combat gangs (Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). Thus, there is a practice exception to any general description of this strategy. Moreover, the injunction process might be slightly different outside California. In this description, we highlight the process of obtaining and implementing CGIs as it is generally understood in California.

³ The injunction area is referred to throughout the report as the Verdugo Flats area or, more simply, the Flats area.

Police officers, often in collaboration with prosecutors, gather evidence that members of a street gang represent a public nuisance in their neighborhood, in violation of California Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480.⁴ Evidence used to support an injunction includes the criminal history of gang members, written declarations by officers familiar with the neighborhood and, sometimes, declarations from community members that describe specific nuisance activities and their effects on neighborhood residents. Our research suggests that community residents usually play a minor, if any, role in the decision to obtain an injunction or in its development (Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). The prosecutor crafts the injunction from these materials, working with officers to select the gang members to be named, the geographic area to be covered and the specific behaviors that will be prohibited.

The number of gang members, the size of the area and the type of prohibited activities varies considerably from injunction to injunction.⁵ Gang members specifically targeted range from a handful to the hundreds, and often a string of names is followed by “and any other members.” The targeted area can be a housing complex, several square blocks or a city, but most often CGIs are spatially based, neighborhood-level interventions intended to disrupt the gang’s routine activities. The prohibited behaviors range from the illegal activities of trespass, vandalism, drug selling and public urination to otherwise legal activities like wearing gang colors or displaying hand signs, and those activities sometimes associated with drug selling (carrying a pager, signaling passing cars). Nighttime curfews are often imposed. Most disturbing to legal scholars and advocates is the commonly applied prohibition against any two named gang members associating with one another.

The prosecutor files the application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or temporary injunction in civil court, and a hearing is scheduled. All named gang members are served notice of the hearing and the injunction. At this hearing, the judge considers the submitted evidence, hears testimony and entertains questions from targeted individuals. Occasionally, individuals are represented by legal counsel, but in civil proceedings, defendants are not provided with public counsel.⁶ Judges sometimes challenge the inclusion of certain individuals, the size of the targeted area or the scope of prohibitions. If the TRO or preliminary injunction is issued at that time, targeted individuals must be served again with amended papers before the injunction can be enforced. Offenders can be prosecuted in either civil or criminal court for violation of a valid court order, and fined or incarcerated for up to six months. Some prosecutors implement a bail enhancement for offenders arrested for violation of the injunction. The TRO can be in effect for a limited time, such as a year, or indefinitely. Prosecutors may seek a permanent injunction and can add individuals or provisions to an existing injunction with relative ease.

⁴ Nuisance is defined by section 3479 as: “Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway.” According to section 3480, “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any other considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.”

⁵ For a detailed description of injunction forms in California and elsewhere, see Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003 and Maxson 2004.

⁶ In addition to pro bono services sometimes offered by private attorneys, occasionally a judge will grant public counsel.

A few gang injunctions have been denied, but judges usually approve them, particularly since the California Supreme court upheld a San Jose injunction in the *Acuna* case (*People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna*, 929 P.2d 596, 1997).⁷ The methods and scope of injunction implementation vary from one injunction to the next. Sometimes a special unit is tasked with enforcement, and at others, the whole patrol force is alerted to the conditions of the injunction. No registry records the number of arrests resulting from injunctions. Interviews with practitioners suggest the number varies widely and there is mixed feeling about whether an injunction needs strong enforcement in order to be effective.

B. History of Development and Expanded Use of Injunctions

Beginning in 1980, law enforcement in Orange and Los Angeles counties obtained a series of civil court injunctions to prohibit gang activity at specific locations in Santa Ana (1980), Pomona (1981), West Covina (1982) and East Los Angeles (1986).⁸ The first injunction against a gang and its members is credited to the Los Angeles city attorney in 1987 (see Los Angeles City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section 1995). Injunction activity increased at a moderate pace, but dramatically accelerated beginning in 1996. Our interviews with gang officers and prosecutors and reviews of practitioner reports and media accounts yielded thirty-seven separate injunctions in Southern California between 1980 and 2000. In the four-year period from 1996 to 1999, a Southern California gang was enjoined, on average, every two months. The majority of this activity took place in Los Angeles County; more than two-thirds of the thirty-one injunctions granted in Southern California in the 1990s were in Los Angeles County. The city of Los Angeles, in particular, has embraced this strategy. At our last count in mid-2003, seventeen injunctions had been issued in the city of Los Angeles. This growth in injunction activity has been fostered by how-to workshops sponsored by the California Association of District Attorneys, detailed training manuals (see Los Angeles County District Attorney, 1996, for an early example), and local descriptions in practitioner publications (Cameron and Skipper 1997; Mazza 1999; Genelin 1999). Gang injunctions also receive widespread attention in local and national media sources.

Noting the increased popularity of injunctions in Southern California and the national interest in gang intervention (Decker 2003), we investigated the prevalence of gang injunctions throughout the country. Interviews with police officers who indicated on a national survey that a CGI had been developed in their jurisdiction suggested that relatively few law enforcement agencies outside California had embraced this strategy (Maxson 2004). In addition to four jurisdictions in Northern California, eleven jurisdictions in seven other states obtained a CGI. We concluded from this study:

⁷ Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane (2003) discuss the legal and procedural issues evident in the legal literature. For a broader discussion of legal advocates' concerns about the use of civil abatement strategies to target gang activity, see Geis 2002.

⁸ This information was gathered from documents prepared by prosecutors (see particularly Castorena 1998 and Whitmer and Ancker 1996), newspaper articles, and interviews with police gang experts and injunction practitioners (see Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003).

Our interviews with the 1999 survey respondents determined that most—about two-thirds—of injunction jurisdictions are located in California. California has more jurisdictions reporting gangs, and reports more gangs and gang members, than any other state (Miller 2001), so the finding that California agencies more often use this intervention devised by California law enforcement is not surprising. We found only modest evidence of the migration of this intervention technology to other states, most frequently Texas, but also other, widely geographically dispersed, locales. It does not appear that this strategy is widely practiced elsewhere—at least, so far.

Among the interview respondents, there was significant confusion regarding what constituted a CGI. Law enforcement outside California is apparently not well versed in the mechanics of this strategy.

C. Logic Model: How CGIs Might Reduce Gang Activity

Most injunction practitioners do not elaborate a fully-developed logic model of the mechanisms by which CGIs are theorized to promote salutary effects. Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane (2003) draw from the criminological and social psychological literatures to suggest three processes that might be relevant. Echoes of these processes are evident in practitioner statements. Deterrence theory provides a common rationale for injunctions. While the penalties for injunction violations are not severe, the notifications of hearings and injunction papers might increase the perception of targeted gang members that they are being closely watched and likely to be apprehended and prosecuted for violations (Klein 1993). Low arrest rates would presumably erode this perception, but practitioners contend that issuance of the injunction has a profound effect on gang members. Longtime community gang intervention activist Father Greg Boyle was cited in a recent press report, “I mean, eight minutes after one was filed here on the Eastside, I had kids in my office saying, ‘Get me a job’ ” (Fremon 2003).

This perceived effect of the injunction might result not from fear of punishment as suggested by deterrence theory, but through a decrease in the deindividuation that accompanies a strong group identity (Postmes and Spears 1998; Spears, Postmes, Lea and Watt 2001). Social psychological theory predicts that an individual’s social identity, arising from group membership and the emotional significance attached to membership, is a significant part of one’s self concept (Tajfel 1981; Turner 1982). Individuals feel less responsible for their own behavior when acting on behalf of their group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). If a gang injunction decreases the salience of gang membership by holding individuals personally accountable for their actions, the effect could be a decrease in group-related behavior (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 2002). Being served with injunction papers might send the message, “We are watching you closely, it is your name on these papers, and you will be held responsible for your behavior.” In this process of holding individuals responsible for their gang activities, the salience of gang identification might decrease, as could the overall gang cohesiveness that is associated with violent gang activity (Klein 1995).

From this point of view, reducing the salience of group identity through individuation is critical. Groups react to threats from the outside by drawing together, increasing the cohesiveness of the

group and thereby strengthening group identity (Dion 1979; Worchel and Austin 1986). In direct contrast to the predicted reduction in gang activities following an injunction, depending on whether group identity is made more or less salient by the way the CGI is implemented and enforced and the way the gang members and leaders react, gang activities could increase in a show of defiance. Gang researchers have observed that conflict with authority figures can reinforce the oppositional culture among gangs, and CGIs might solidify gang identity (Klein 1995; Vigil 1988). The press notoriety often associated with issuing injunctions might serve to increase the status of the gang, thereby augmenting gang cohesion. The details of the way CGIs are implemented and enforced could implicate one reaction or the other. Implementation activities that send a message that the group is the primary target may backfire, whereas activities that promote individuation from the group would be more likely to produce positive results.

A third mechanism by which injunctions might work derives from social disorganization theory (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). The process of developing and implementing a gang injunction may engage community members in an overall effort to build informal social control, social capital and supportive organizational structures in deteriorating neighborhoods. Direct effects may derive from community resident empowerment processes, while reducing the level of the immediate threat of the gang to community residents may lay a foundation for shoring up community control that reduces criminal activity. This perspective is also compatible with theories of neighborhood disorder (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). The deterioration of the physical and social order in the community, with its attendant effects on fear of crime and civic engagement, might be reversed by the attenuation of gang visibility and intimidation.

These anticipated effects are often noted in the injunction practitioner literature (Los Angeles City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section 1995). The goals of injunctions typically are couched in community policing terms, such as solving specific community crime, disorder and fear problems (Greene 2003). For example, an injunction manual explicitly advances the community policing/prosecution perspective as the ideological foundation for CGIs:

Instead of relying chiefly on arrests and convictions, community-based law enforcement is premised upon the fact that the quality of life of a neighborhood cannot improve unless residents actively participate with police and elected officials in the restoration of the neighborhood (Los Angeles County District Attorney 1996:2).

Higher levels of community involvement and greater impact on community environments might be expected from injunctions developed and implemented with this philosophical orientation, as compared with other forms of gang enforcement (Decker 2003).

These three broad perspectives point to different outcomes of CGIs. Deterrence theory and individuation might be tested by interviews with targeted gang members or the examination of changes in crime patterns. The community perspective, however, suggests that injunctions should improve patterns in community processes, such as neighborhood relationships, disorder and informal social control. Our evaluation addresses this type of community-level outcome, rather than the individual gang member outcomes suggested by deterrence and individuation.

These latter effects may well be precursors to effects on community residents, but these are not captured by the research design of our study. The few evaluations of injunctions conducted to date consider the impact on criminal behavior; our study is the first to focus on neighborhood processes.

Accordingly, the conceptual basis for the evaluation presumes a direct—and untested—impact of the injunctions on gang activity. The more immediate, or proximal, effects on neighborhood residents should be observed in reduced gang visibility, graffiti, instances of gang intimidation and fear of gang victimization as well as increased police visibility. These benefits should result in reduced fear of crime more generally, crime victimization, and improved community order. Ultimately, residents in neighborhoods targeted by injunctions may experience increased neighborhood social cohesion and informal social control, more collective and neighborhood social efficacy, more willingness to call police in threatening situations and improved perceptions of police authority.

D. Prior Research on the Impact of CGIs

Proclamations of the success of gang injunctions surface regularly in practitioner publications and media accounts. Many jurisdictions have multiple injunctions, and presumably, repetition of the strategy follows a positive experience. We have illustrated these success claims and the anecdotal evidence marshaled to support them elsewhere (Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). In these accounts, changes in crime rates are sometimes noted, but without adequate comparison to equivalent areas or offenders. For example, one recent review of arrest profiles of gang members named in two injunctions in Long Beach by a journalist found that eighty percent of targeted individuals continued to offend following the injunction (Russell 2003). About half of the convictions were for crimes within the injunction area.

We have located just three independent research studies on injunctions. Maxson and Allen (1997) conducted a process evaluation of a CGI in Inglewood, California. Their brief assessment of reported crime in the target area suggested little support for a positive effect. A legal advocacy organization conducted a statistical analysis of various crime indicators in nineteen reporting districts including and surrounding the Blythe Street injunction implemented by the Los Angeles Police Department in the San Fernando Valley (ACLU 1997). The authors concluded that this injunction increased violent crime.

In the most rigorous study of crime patterns to date, Grogger (2002) assessed changes in reported serious violent and property crimes for fourteen injunctions obtained in Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1998. His study is noteworthy in that he compared crime trends in the injunction areas with those in matched comparison areas. Pooling all the injunction areas together, he found that violent crime decreased during the year following injunctions by roughly five to ten percent. This effect was concentrated in reductions in assault, rather than in robbery. He found no effect in property crimes, and no evidence that injunctions caused crime to rise in adjoining areas. Because all the injunctions were aggregated in this analysis, whether some injunctions were more effective than others was not clear. Moreover, the crime data are not parsed into offenses committed by gang members, or the specific individuals targeted by the

injunctions. Still, this study is the first scholarly report of positive effects of injunctions on crime in neighborhoods targeted by CGIs.

Official crime statistics have limitations for the assessment of the impact of injunctions. The areas targeted by injunctions are generally quite small and thus present difficulties for detecting stable trends in crime data. Furthermore, there is ambiguity regarding the interpretation of these trends. Injunction activities could promote increases in levels of reported crime (as when engaged residents believe in the efficacy of reporting crimes to the police) and arrests (due to increased patrol resources and visibility) even though the ultimate objective is crime reduction. Official crime data are vulnerable to intervener effects on recording practices and this could be especially challenging for gang crime reports since targeted gangs are subjected to heightened attention during all phases of the injunction process. For these reasons, an important goal is seeking alternative data sources for program outcome assessment. The design of civil injunction interventions is highly compatible with community assessment techniques.

E. Objectives of This Research

As noted above, evaluation outcomes investigated by this study did not include area crime rates or the individual behaviors of targeted gang members. Instead, we attempted to capture the changes in neighborhood experiences, fear of crime and other quality of life measures that crime theory and injunction practitioners suggest should be effected by CGIs. The specific evaluation aims of the study are:

- 1) to measure the impact of civil gang injunctions on community residents' perception of crime and neighborhood quality, and
- 2) to determine whether positive programmatic effects are at the cost of displacing gang activity into surrounding areas.

F. Site Selection Activities

The study's quasi-experimental research design required pre/post tests or two survey waves of community residents in injunction and comparison areas. Therefore, the first task of the research was to locate a jurisdiction within reasonable proximity of the research office that was seriously anticipating obtaining a CGI. Due to their pivotal roles in developing and expanding the use of injunctions, our first stop was the Los Angeles city and county police and prosecutors. Despite a history of prior research collaboration with police and prosecutors in both jurisdictions, protracted negotiations over a period of several months did not yield the level of cooperation we sought for this study. While the interviews we conducted with Los Angeles city and county practitioners provided useful materials and contextual information for our investigation of injunctions, we expanded our search for an appropriate site to other jurisdictions by conducting telephone interviews with gang unit personnel throughout Southern California.

The National Youth Gang Center provided data from their 1998 National Youth Gang Survey of police. We selected Southern California city agencies that reported significant gang populations (at least 450 members, an arbitrary figure based on the distribution) and multi-agency

collaborations. Los Angeles was included in this sample. We interviewed at least one officer from twenty-five of the twenty-nine agencies that met these criteria. Thirteen of these jurisdictions had obtained a total of thirty injunctions. While the primary purpose was to identify candidate sites for the study, we used this opportunity to question these police gang experts regarding their injunction experience and their thoughts about the conditions under which CGIs might be effective. The results of this study are reported elsewhere (Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). We concluded that CGIs were a widely accepted tool and found consensus on two of the circumstances when they are most useful. These officers felt that gangs whose identity and activities are deeply rooted in a specific gang territory were best suited to CGIs. Furthermore, most officers felt that CGIs should be sought only as a last resort, when other approaches to reduce gang activity had failed. While the need for a close collaboration between police and prosecutors was widely recognized, there was less agreement about the role of community residents in CGI development and implementation. Just one third of the agencies that had used injunctions highlighted the importance of community support and involvement.

These interviews helped to improve our understanding of the social context and decision-making to obtain an injunction. Moreover, we identified three agencies that were seriously exploring injunction activity in the near future. We initially pursued our research interests with all three agencies, and over a series of interviews and site visits, began to focus our attention on San Bernardino as the optimal site for the study.

II. Local Research Context

A. San Bernardino as Research Site

Overview

San Bernardino presented several advantages for the research. First, the San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) had already conducted three injunctions (against the Seventh Street gang in November 1997, Sur Crazy Ones in fall 1999, and one against prostitutes along a main boulevard) prior to our first contact with them. Second, the gangs that they were considering for further injunctions seemed excellent targets for studying the impact on communities. Third, the department welcomed our inquiry and proved throughout to be very helpful in all regards.

Map 1
City of San Bernardino
in relation to other California Cities



San Bernardino is roughly sixty miles east of Los Angeles in the rapidly growing Inland Empire. While the city is part of one of the fastest expanding economic areas in Southern California, it is also home to a large number of poor minorities. The city has been home to gangs for decades, and gangs have been expanding throughout the last one-third of a century.

Demographic and social profile

In 2000, over 185,000 people lived in the city of San Bernardino.⁹ That was up from 114,000 in 1980. The city grew almost forty percent in the 1980s, slowing to just under thirteen percent growth in the 1990s. Almost half of the population was Latino, roughly eighteen percent were African Americans, and just under thirty percent white. More than one in five of the residents in this multicultural city was born outside the United States, with almost another twenty percent born outside of California. Less than sixty percent of the population speaks English only at home, while over one-third speaks Spanish only.

It is a growing, highly mobile, even fragmented city. Fewer than half of all householders lived in the same house in 2000 that they inhabited in 1995. Half of the city's population owns their own residence. Just over half of the households include individuals under eighteen. Over forty percent of all renters pay over thirty-five percent of their income in rent, suggesting that, as in many US cities, poor renters are precariously housed.

Further, many households are without a car in an area that is very decentralized. Just over fifteen percent of households have no car, while an additional thirty-eight percent have one car, which is probably used regularly for commuting, leaving anyone at home without access. Since thirty-eight percent of households make under \$25,000 a year, they often cannot afford a second car. The US census reports that 23.5% of families were living in poverty, and forty-four percent of families headed by a single mother were in poverty.

The California Youth Violence Prevention Scorecard rates only the effort of San Bernardino County, not San Bernardino City, but still it is a dismal record (Choices for Youth 2002). The county is only one of two (of the fifteen largest counties) in California to receive a "D" as a Safe Community, and a "D" in its Availability of Choices for Youth. It had very low grades for Assault Victimization and High School Graduation with UC/CSU Requirements. Investigators found that the county was spending zero percentage of its federal after-school funding on high school youth and only one-third of its Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention Act money on prevention. The report did highlight that San Bernardino had received the state's largest share of competitive mentor funding and had received a California State Association of Counties Award for its Community Assessment Teams.

In October 2003, the Los Angeles Times reported that violent crime had declined statewide over the preceding year. However, San Bernardino City saw one of the largest increases in the state, almost twenty-three percent. San Bernardino Police Department officials were quoted as saying that the increase was a result of "continued economic problems, high rates of gang membership and a large number of parolees." Lt. Frank Mankin pointed out that San Bernardino was "a poor socioeconomic area." He believed, though, that the "town is trying to make a comeback" (Warren 2003). Part of that comeback was based on the ability of the SBPD to use tactics such as the civil gang injunction to limit the impact of gangs on community life.

⁹ Demographic data is from the 2000 US Census and the state website on San Bernardino:
<http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/Census2000/SanBerdoCityDP2000.pdf>

Public perception of the city of San Bernardino

A selective look at the San Bernardino newspapers (San Bernardino County Sun and the San Bernardino Press-Enterprise) found that city improvement and crime were prime concerns in this growing and ethnically diverse city. As with many other older cities struggling with demographic change and economic uncertainty, the area's newspapers highlight efforts to improve downtown, maintain safety in neighborhoods and bring economic development to the city. In September 2002, the Sun ran a story about "measures to clean up downtown" (Nelson 2002b). The story reported the integrated effort to attack crime through civil gang injunctions against street gangs and prostitutes and the improved business climate along the commercial street Base Line.

In 2001, the city embarked on a campaign to revitalize downtown by completing a series of conversations with residents. The initial series were reported in the first Downtown Revitalization Bulletin, which quoted participants as stating:

Many people thought that San Bernardino is "uninviting, in disrepair and unsafe," though some spoke to a strong sense of community with activity at churches, schools and "children playing in front yards." A number of individuals were concerned about homelessness, and "run-down motels" and their associated problems. ...In terms of planning and development, many felt San Bernardino has "no sense of place", which has been exacerbated by "themeless," haphazard development; as a result "there's no incentive for visitors or tourists to stop in the City."¹⁰

The state of this effort is at this time uncertain, especially given the nation's continuing economic troubles.

Westside San Bernardino, the site of the civil gang injunction target area, is largely portrayed as a place desperately in need of improvement. In November 2002, the (Riverside) Press-Enterprise ran a story on two shootings, one in Riverside, one on San Bernardino's west side (Fisher, Goad and Hill 2002). As a longtime community advocate noted, the "neighborhood will never shed its bad image without a grass-roots effort." The story, as illustrated in the article, is a familiar one of crime, low educational attainment, community fragmentation and economic despair. "We talk about getting people jobs but we have people that can't keep a job because they don't have those basic skills." The press coverage of the area seems fixated on crime and safety, with considerable discussion of the neighborhood's difficulties.

Target site selection

We initially met with the SBPD personnel in spring 2000. At that point, they were considering an injunction against the Delman Heights gang, with other gangs such as Five Times and Verdugo Flats in line after this gang. Ultimately, the department placed the Delman Heights injunction on hiatus because of concerns that an injunction might be less effective against an African American gang and the police's observation that the gang had grown less active.

¹⁰ The Bulletin's primary purpose was to invite people to join the next phase of the project as overseen by EE&K Architects. It is not dated, but was printed roughly around December 2001.

Police statements during interviews in mid-2000 regarding Delman Heights and the other injunctions showed the fluidity of circumstances under which injunctions are targeted. Five Times “was not intimidating enough to warrant” an injunction, yet was the subject of an injunction in early 2002; Verdugo Flats gang was under control because the officers there were “so proactive,” yet would be a focus of work on an injunction in September 2002. Conversely, Delman Heights was considered a prime target for an injunction in 2000, yet would be the subject of an injunction only in September 2003, after Five Times and Flats.

The Department then began focusing their attention on a possible injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang, leading us to select that area for our survey procedures.

B. History of Other San Bernardino Civil Gang Injunctions

The first civil injunction initiated for the purposes of opposing criminal activity in San Bernardino was in the mid-1990s against a family residence across from San Bernardino High School. The injunction barred more than one son from being on the property at any one time (Nelson 2002a). In the years that followed, the SBPD has used the civil injunction to aggressively suppress two groups, territorial street gangs and prostitutes. Three prostitution injunctions were made permanent between 1999 and 2003. These were initiated in an effort to disperse well-known street prostitution areas.

The first injunction against a territorial gang was instituted against the Seventh Street gang in November 1997 (see Table 1, reporting dates that permanent injunctions were received). As with the Verdugo Flats gang, the Seventh Street gang had been a visible presence on the city’s west side for at least three decades. This Latino gang was considered by police to be an active, territorial drug gang that effectively and tragically intimidated their neighborhood. Police reported that cars would be subject to random shootings, streets were darkened, and “the night belonged to the crooks.”

Table 1
San Bernardino Territorial Civil Gang Injunctions, 1998-2003

Territory	Permanent Injunction Date	Type
Seventh Street	Nov 1998	Gang
Baseline Downtown	Mar 1999	Prostitution
Sur Crazy Ones	Mar 2000	Gang
Mount Vernon	Dec 2001	Prostitution
Baseline East	Feb 2003	Prostitution
Verdugo Flats	Mar 2003	Gang
Five Times	Jun 2003	Gang
Delman Heights	Oct 2003*	Gang
Projects	Oct 2003*	Gang

* To date, Delman Heights is still under the preliminary injunction, and Projects is under a temporary restraining order, so those dates are shown here.

The injunction was initiated to “control gang members legally,” as Lt. Smith of the SBPD put it in an interview in 2000. “People need to see the evidence that the good guys are back in control. It’s the small things, broken beer bottles, streetlights, graffiti, litter, hear[ing] gunshots, see[ing] a group of thugs hanging out. Control this and people begin to take back an interest and begin to renew.” Police viewed the injunction as critical to that process of renewal.

Fifty-four members of the Seventh Street gang were served with notice of their inclusion in the injunction. The key element of the injunction provisions from a police perspective was Subsection F, which barred association between the enjoined individuals. Prior to the injunction, as many as twenty of the gang members commonly walked down the street, but under the CGI that was not possible.

According to one police informant, the injunction was carefully and extensively enforced. The attorney assigned to the injunction had procured bail enhancements as part of the process, meaning that if an individual was arrested under the injunction, they might well spend considerable time in jail since they would not be able to finance a bond. For example, an enjoined individual was arrested two or three times for having a weapon. By the third time, the bail enhancements dictated a \$20,000 jail bond, which the individual could not finance.

Second, the police actively promoted the injunction. The sergeant in charge of the injunction created a photo array of the enjoined individuals that was posted in the patrol room along with a map of the injunction area and enforcement tips. The injunction was emphasized at patrol meetings. The Metropolitan Enforcement Team (MET), the gang suppression unit of the SBPD, was called in for extra patrols. One police officer reported that over three hundred arrests had been made in conjunction with the injunction. Additionally, the city attorney was involved at every stage of the process. Finally, six months to a year after the injunction was initiated, the city

started a Neighborhood Improvement Campaign where city services moved in to conduct code enforcement and other activities.

In the fall of 1999, another was instituted against a neighboring westside San Bernardino, Latino gang, the Sur Crazy Ones. Eleven individuals were named in the injunction, but only nine were served. The photo arrays and map of the area were placed in the patrol room. By mid-2000, police believed that only two members were still in the target area. The officers made only one arrest. As one police informant put it, “The injunction was the end for that gang.”

The next two civil gang injunctions occurred against African American gangs—Five Times in early 2003 and Delman Heights in October 2003 (Rochester 2003). The injunctions were the result of a continuing turf war between the gangs, during which a Five Times member had been killed while trying to sell tire rims in Delman Heights. These injunctions were roughly the same size as that of the Sur Crazy Ones, with roughly a dozen members being listed on the injunction. The SBPD documentation is similar in both cases, noting that these are territorial gangs that have intimidated their neighborhoods.

C. Flats Injunction: Chronology and Implementation

On August 5, 2002, the San Bernardino Police Department initiated implementation of a civil gang injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang as the result of the submission of a civil suit brought that day in the appropriate court. As many of the gang’s members had been jailed in 2000 and 2001, the department had delayed consideration of an injunction against this gang. However, in early summer 2002 five shootings and one assault occurred that suggested that the gang was actively defending its territory against a possible intrusion by an African American gang (Cardona 2003). The combination of heightened violence and the inter-racial nature of the gang fight led authorities to move to file the injunction in September 2002 (Staff Reports 2002).

A total of twenty members of the gang were specifically mentioned in the suit, but only nineteen were found to have sufficient reasons to be included in the injunction. Thirteen of the nineteen were in jail at the time of the injunction. The suit requested, and the court approved—instituting a Temporary Restraining Order on September 24, 2002—that these individuals were prohibited from twenty-two activities.

These activities were:

- Selling, possessing or using controlled substances or related paraphernalia
- Remaining in the presence of anyone selling, possessing or using controlled substances
- Approaching or signaling to any vehicle, thus causing the vehicle to stop
- Throwing a rock, bottle, brick at a vehicle, animal or person
- Blocking the free passage of any person or vehicle
- Being on the private property of others except with prior written consent or in the presence of the person in possession of the property
- Being in an uninhabited or abandoned apartment or building

- If under 18, being in a public place between 9 pm – 6 am Sunday to Thursday, 10 pm – 6 am Friday and Saturday, unless accompanied by a parent or spouse (over 18), performing an act for a guardian/parent, returning home from a public meeting/entertainment, actively engaged in business/trade which requires it
- If 18 or over, being in a public place from 12 am – sunrise unless going from a business or entertainment activity
- Making, causing or encouraging others to violate noise restrictions
- Fighting in public
- Drinking alcoholic beverage in public
- Urinating in public
- Littering
- Possessing or using any dangerous weapon (including gun, knife, bb gun, metal pipe, baseball bat, hammer or illegal weapon)
- Damaging or vandalizing property
- Applying graffiti to public or private property
- Possessing any graffiti tool
- Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public with another defendant
- Demanding entrance into another's residence
- Intimidating, provoking, threatening, confronting, harassing, challenging or carrying out acts of retaliation against anyone who complained or will complain about their activities, and against any person who signed a declaration in support of this action

SBPD believes that the Verdugo Flats claims as its territory a large swath of southwestern San Bernardino. It is a large, heavily Latino area that has been home to the gang for decades. The injunction area reflected police understanding of the gang's territory, being bounded by 3rd Street on the north, the 215 Freeway on the east, Muscott and Bordwell on the west, and Johnston and Grant on the south. Captain Aragon noted in an interview that it was the largest injunction area they had ever attempted to patrol.

The injunction request was supported by a series of declarations from SBPD officers. The officers detailed their interactions with individual defendants as well as described the Verdugo Flats (VF) gang history and structure. The gang apparently originated in the 1970s and has been active ever since. One officer notes that the gang had roughly one hundred and fifty members as of August 2001, a twenty percent increase from two years before. The officers repeatedly mention that the gang is "turf-oriented," claiming their area (the area in which the injunction was instituted) through extensive graffiti and intimidation of residents. One officer notes that the gang is actually split into three subgroups, VF Pear Street, VF Congress Street, and VF Marijuanos, a term apparently used by the oldest of the gang members. The group also goes by VF Rifa, and South Side VF. These subgroups account for some of the varied acronyms used in the graffiti, including SSVF, VFG and VFR.

The original court date for consideration of the TRO was September 13, 2002, but two defendants requested and received a delay until September 24, at which time the TRO was

instituted. The two defendants had asked for and received permission to associate with each other and other gang members during working hours, since a group that actively hired gang members employed them.

In conversations leading up to the implementation, SBPD officials suggested that the department would implement the injunction using a standard set of procedures that they had developed in previous injunctions. The procedures were that enjoined individuals would be named at patrol meetings, photographs of the individuals would be placed on the wall of the room where patrol officers get their briefings and MET officers would provide the primary enforcement for the injunction.

In one interview, two top officials suggested that the SBPD might implement a public relations campaign to inform residents about the injunction and encourage them to report criminal acts against them. In the earlier Seventh Street injunction, the department had officers go around and talk with residents in the injunction area. While we have no evidence that they instituted such a community campaign in relation to the Flats injunction, at least two local newspaper articles (on August 7, 2002 and September 24, 2002) reported the legal action against the gang. The articles noted the boundaries of the injunction area, and highlighted such prohibitions as not being allowed to possess any tool that could be used for graffiti or drug sales and the association with enjoined gang members.

As in earlier injunctions, the SBPD initiated a "sweep" of the injunction area right after they obtained the injunction. They searched homes of parolees and probationers and checked on outstanding warrants. They catalogued paraphernalia, photographs and clothing. They took the entire day to go through the target area.

Further, as a part of this procedure, MET officers trained patrol officers in using the appropriate forms to arrest gang members on the injunction, and made sure that the in-house computer would notify patrol officers if an injunction member was stopped and identified. One police informant noted that he came in several times on his day off to work with patrol officers who had apprehended an enjoined individual.

From the inception of the Flats CGI in September 2002 to January 2004, five individuals were arrested related to the injunction. This number was considerably fewer than under the Seventh Street injunction, but more than arrests attributed to the Sur Crazy Ones injunction during a similar time period. Further, arrested individuals were liable for enhanced bail of up to \$25,000. The SBPD had previously used this technique, which means that arrested individuals could serve considerably more jail time.

Five months after the implementation of the injunction, we interviewed an officer partly responsible for the injunction's implementation about its success. He felt that the impact of the implementation had been dramatic. "The gang members were scared to come outside, scared to hang out together." And, "it is still working." He noted that graffiti and other signs of gang activity have declined dramatically. He pointed out that a wall near the park had graffiti 24/7, 365 days a year prior to the injunction, but not lately. Further, he heard from several community

residents that they were glad that it had been done, they see the police more than before, and "keep up the good work."

Possibly, the injunction had played a role in the signs of gang fragmentation that police noted. In July 2003, three young girls were murdered in Lytle Creek Park, a key gang hangout (Martinez 2003). A 13-year-old who police say the older gang members did not acknowledge as a member of the gang committed the murder. Reportedly, he represented a clique, Congress Street Flats, that had split from the original Verdugo Flats gang, along with yet another new clique, Pear Street Flats. The two new cliques are apparently younger, and one is racially mixed. The SBPD believe that the rise of the cliques suggests that the gang has been weakened after three decades of solidarity. They don't claim that the injunction was the cause of the split, but one officer pointed out that he first noticed it around the beginning of the injunction.

Interviews with SBPD officers were useful in illuminating the processes of developing and implementing the Verdugo Flats CGI. The research design employed community resident surveys to assess the impact of the injunction on the targeted neighborhood.

III. Methods

A. Research Design

The consensus among the many police officers and attorneys involved in civil gang injunctions who were interviewed was that gang injunctions have an immediate impact on gang behavior. Gang members were less visible, stopped their intimidation, even disappeared altogether, relatively quickly after an injunction was filed. Consequently, we opted to time our second survey wave to test the impact of this immediate change in gang members' behaviors on neighborhood residents' attitudes and perceptions. We predicted that specific experiences of gang intimidation, fear of gang members, visibility of the gang and graffiti would all decrease within the first six months after the injunction and the visibility of the police would increase. We also tested the impact on more intermediate outcomes: fear of crime, crime victimization and perceived level of social disorder. Longer-term, gang injunctions were predicted to have a positive impact on aspects of community organization through neighborhood social networks and neighborhood collective action. We included survey measures of neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective efficacy, neighborhood efficacy, willingness to call the police and trust in the police, though we expected that these changes would evolve over a longer period of time.

To test our hypotheses about the immediate impact of the injunction on neighborhood residents, we chose a before-after nonequivalent comparison group design with multiple comparison groups. As originally conceived, we planned to survey the residents of the Flats injunction area as well as three different comparison areas approximately six months before the injunction and again approximately six months after the injunction. The comparison areas chosen were: 1) a highly disordered area with no territorial gang presence; 2) a gang area that has an active gang injunction filed three years before; and 3) a nearby area that was low in disorder. The three comparison neighborhoods were also chosen as possible sites for displaced Flats gang activity after the injunction.

The first comparison would serve as a control for local factors other than the gang injunction that might cause shifts in the dependent variables across disordered neighborhoods in this section of the city over that time. The second comparison would provide an estimate of the level of fear and intimidation residents experience several years after a gang injunction. While it was too soon to expect much impact on community disorganization variables in the new injunction area, by Wave 2 the prior injunction area had had an active injunction for several years. If injunctions stimulate longer-term changes in community participation and organization, we predicted that this comparison area would be higher on these variables, especially in Wave 2, than the disorderly control and the Flats injunction area. The third comparison area was originally conceptualized as a lower disorder area that would remain stable and control for very broad trends in the city that affected residents' perceptions of safety. More importantly, this area would demonstrate that our measures were sensitive enough to detect differences in levels of fear and intimidation across areas that vary in level of disorder.

Two changes in our original research design became necessary. First, as discussed above, the injunction was not filed six months after the first survey. It was filed approximately eighteen

months later. Second, the boundaries of the injunction area were drawn farther south than anticipated. Much of the less disorderly comparison area that we had surveyed in Wave 1 was now included within the injunction boundaries. For this reason, we split this area into two parts: creating a secondary injunction area that had relatively low disorder at the time of Wave 1 and the remaining low disorder comparison area. As it turned out, the remaining low disorder comparison area became a good control for the secondary injunction area, since the two were very similar at the time of the first survey. We were uncertain what changes to predict for the secondary injunction area. As gang activity increased after Wave 1, higher fear and intimidation might be expected by the time of Wave 2, though the injunction should have reduced these experiences. While the secondary injunction area may have experienced profound changes over the two years between Wave 1 and Wave 2, it would be difficult for us to determine their sequence.

B. Area Descriptions

On several occasions we spoke with police officials, gaining from them insight on the location of territorial gangs and disorderly areas. From these discussions, we identified the five neighborhoods that fit the requirements of our research design. These neighborhoods are described in detail below, and shown on Map 2

1. Area C-H (Control-High Disorder) is not the territorial location of a street gang but it is physically and socially disorderly. It is the only study area east of the 215 Freeway:

West:	215 Freeway primarily, with a small section starting on G St.
North:	16 th Street
East:	E Street primarily, with a small section starting on F Street
South:	W. Virginia primarily, with a small section on 13 th Street


This area has been clearly undergoing significant economic and social stress. Based on Census data, almost eighty percent of the 1616 residents reported that they had moved to the area within the last five years. One-third of residents lived in housing units with more than four units, while only a quarter lived in single-family houses. The area has the lowest percentage of Latinos, at seventy-three percent, with fourteen percent African American and ten percent whites. The area has the highest percentage of residents (sixty-seven percent) living below the poverty line among all our areas (the demographic information on the populations of the five study areas, along with the achieved sample characteristics of Wave 1, is shown in Table 5).

A windshield survey of the area in the year 2000 revealed numerous abandoned housing units and many other indications of physical and social disorder. The census reinforced these findings when it reported that twenty-two percent of all housing units were vacant, the highest of any of the areas in our study. It also had the lowest percentage of owner-occupied housing units, a mere twenty-three percent (compared to a high of seventy-three percent in Area C-L).

We interviewed several police officials to discover an area of high social disorder near the injunction site that was not the home of a territorial street gang. Every interviewee agreed that this area north of downtown was such an area. As we began our analysis in late 2003, we again

checked with a member of the SBPD's MET unit to ensure that the police had not changed their opinion of this area, and they had not.

Map 2
Five Study Areas in San Bernardino



2. Area I-H (Injunction-High Disorder) is the primary injunction target area. Its boundaries are:

West: Mount Vernon
North: 3rd Street
East: 215 Freeway
South: Esperanza / Mill

The injunction area has a large Latino population (eighty-two percent) with relatively little education (fifty-nine percent of the residents twenty-five or older have not finished high school), a significant percentage of people living in poverty (forty-four percent), and a small proportion of owner-occupied housing units (thirty percent). The area has a lower rate of mobility than Area C-H, but at sixty-three percent (of residents who moved within the last five years), it is still an area with consistent and continuous change. It is a large area, with over 4600 people living in 1173 households.

A windshield survey of the area found considerable graffiti, abandoned housing, small mom-and-pop retail establishments, and a number of large institutional parcels filled with schools and parks. The census confirmed that almost seventeen percent of housing units were vacant. The area is a warren of small streets, with additional housing units often situated in the rear of the main unit. House numbers, front doors and other identifiers are often obscured.

The boundaries of the injunction area were identified through key informant interviews with police officials involved in the development of the injunction. They informed us that the Flats gang was active south of the railroad tracks, which made the northern boundary 3rd Street, west of the 215 Freeway, east of Mount Vernon Avenue, and south to at least Mill or Esperanza. Later, the actual injunction area would turn out to be larger than this, with small portions west of Mount Vernon and a considerable section south of Esperanza.

3. Area C-P (Control-Previous Injunction) is a control area that had an earlier injunction and continues to be a socially and physically disorderly place.

West: Mount Vernon
North: Baseline Avenue
East: 215 Freeway
South: 8th Street

This area is the home of a strong, traditional Latino street gang. The SBPD served the gang with an injunction in November 1997. In the aftermath, they made over one hundred arrests and used both police suppression and community improvement strategies as a means to control the activities of the gang.

The area has 2315 residents living in 567 households, of whom eighty-one percent identify as Hispanic and thirteen percent African American. Almost sixty-nine percent of residents spoke Spanish at home, and almost a third were linguistically isolated through the sole use of Spanish. Thirty-eight percent of residents live in poverty. The area also has one of the highest owner-

occupied percentages at forty-seven percent and a low figure only two percent of housing units with more than four units (compared to thirty-four percent in Area C-H and twenty-four percent in Area I-H).

The housing in Area C-P is very uneven. A windshield survey found some abandoned (sixteen percent in the census) and dilapidated homes, few businesses other than those on Mount Vernon and many defensive gates/fences. At the same time, a number of homes had lovely gardens or carefully maintained residences.

We chose to include this area for two reasons. First, since the Seventh Street gang had been the subject of an earlier injunction, we wanted to see how community attitudes there would differ from those of residents in the new injunction area and the non-gang disorderly area. Second, we presumed that displacement of crime, if it did occur, was likely to occur contiguous to the injunction area. Since the Seventh Street gang presumably had been diminished by the earlier injunction, we felt that this area might be a place where Flats gang activities would be displaced.


4. Area I-L (Injunction Low Disorder) is the secondary injunction area, defined after the CGI was filed. Boundaries are:

West: Mount Vernon, small portion of K Street
North: Mill Street / Esperanza Street
East: 215 Freeway
South: Grant

Area I-L is a relatively small area (210 households), and more demographically similar to the adjacent control area (C-L) than it is to the high disorder injunction area (I-H). Residents have a relatively higher education achievement (forty-eight percent had finished high school in I-L compared to forty-one percent in I-H), higher homeowner rates (seventy-three percent compared to thirty percent), and a much lower number of people below poverty (twenty-seven percent compared to forty-four percent in I-H). The area is heavily Latino (eighty-three percent) and almost three-quarters of the population speaks Spanish at home. As with most of the other areas, the residents are relatively recent arrivals, with over half having moved into their homes within the last five years.

We were not originally told that the area included in I-L would be included within the injunction boundaries. In our early discussions with police officials, they indicated that the southern boundary of the injunction would be around Mill or Esperanza Streets. However, in the documents presented to the court, the boundaries were expanded to include this southern portion down to Grant Street. Further investigation reinforced the different nature of this area. As part of those documents, officers provided a list of all their contacts with the individuals served with the injunction. These contacts ranged from incidents of stopping and talking with individuals to arresting them. An examination of those contacts (n=141 as mapped in Map 3) show that all but fourteen occurred inside the primary injunction area, and none occurred in the area we propose as I-L. Based on the original discussions with police officials and the results of the mapping of these contacts, we decided to maintain Area I-L as a separate area of analysis to see if the injunction would play out differently in this secondary injunction neighborhood.

Map 3
 Location of Contacts with Individuals Cited in SBPD Declarations
 in Flats Civil Gang Injunction,
 Injunction Boundaries and Study Areas



5. Area C-L (Control Low Disorder) boundaries are:

West: Mission
North: Grant
East: 215 Freeway
South: Hillcrest and Inland

Area C-L is not the territorial location of a street gang and is not as socially or physically disorderly as the first three described areas. This small area (128 households) is contiguous to the southern border of the added injunction Area I-L. Its size makes compiling demographic statistics difficult. Some population and housing data are available, but other types of data are only available at a higher spatial aggregation. It has relatively few people living in poverty (twenty-seven percent), the highest owner-occupied housing rate (73.4%), of whom eighty percent are in single-family detached homes, and a relatively high educational achievement (forty-eight percent completed high school).

A windshield survey of the area found many well-tended gardens, fewer chain-linked fences, fewer abandoned (only four percent according to the census) or vandalized structures, and a welcoming appearance. The area is on the edge of a large cross-town street (Inland Avenue) as well as many vacant lots to its south, so it is physically and socially isolated from the south and east.

This second control area, C-L, met two purposes. First, contiguous to the secondary injunction area, it could become the scene of displaced gang activities because it neither had an established gang nor was it located beyond the strong physical barrier of the railroad tracks, as was Seventh Street. Second, this area would test whether our measures of fear and intimidation were sensitive enough to detect differences in the attitudes and perceptions of residents living in areas that were high or low in neighborhood disorder.

C. Measures

The survey /interview instrument was designed to be sensitive to shifts in fear and intimidation, disorder and community concerns. The intention was to use this instrument to assess the intervention's impact after roughly six months of implementation. The questions were constructed to measure a series of predicted changes that would occur sequentially as the intervention was implemented. We proposed that the civil gang injunction would have several proximal or immediate impacts as well as several intermediate or longer-term impacts. We presumed, given the rapidity with which we were surveying after implementation, that we would see only changes on the directly related measures, but wanted to see if any longer-term measures changed in the primary injunction area, or appeared to have changed in the control area with an injunction three years prior. We consulted a number of surveys before beginning this one, including our sources for an earlier community policing survey for the Los Angeles Police Department (Maxson, Hennigan, Sloane and Ranney 1999), among which were the New Jersey City Public Housing Resident Survey, University of Texas at Arlington Social Work Citizen Survey, University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory Citizen Attitudes and Victimization Survey, the Chicago Community Policing Resident Survey, the Spokane Police

Department and Washington State University Crime and Criminal Justice Survey, and the Joliet Police Department School Neighborhood Questionnaire. Other surveys from which we adapted additional material include: the Denver Youth Survey, the National Crime Victimization Survey, the University of California at Irvine Fear of Crime and Gangs Survey, and others. In the second wave, we added a series of questions regarding community organization; these were adapted from the Harvard Social Capital Benchmark.

Measures of immediate outcomes

Five immediate outcomes are directly related to gangs or the injunction. All but the first were drafted for this study. To measure change in the level of police presence in the neighborhood, a question asked in community policing surveys was used: "In the last six months, how often have you seen police officers in your neighborhood patrolling?" The five response categories were: never, rarely, sometimes, monthly, weekly or more. The frequency of several gang activities was also asked using the same response categories. The first item measured gang visibility: "In the last six months in your neighborhood: how often have you seen gang members hanging out; and how often have you seen new graffiti or gang tags?" Four items were combined to form the gang intimidation scale including "In the last six months in your neighborhood: how often has someone you know been hassled by gang members; how often have young persons been bullied by gang members; how often have you or a family member felt frightened by a gang member; how often have gang activities made you feel anxious at home in the evening or night?" These items were well-correlated with Cronbach's alpha equal to .87 in Wave 1 and .90 in Wave 2. Because the distribution of these items was strongly skewed, the gang intimidation scores were made dichotomous by recoding to never for all activities or ever for any of the four activities. Fear of gangs was measured by asking "How much do you fear that you or a member of your family will be confronted by a gang member in the neighborhood?" Responses were coded from 1 to 4 for not at all fearful, a little fearful, fearful, or very fearful.

Measures of intermediate outcomes

More general variables predicted to be influenced by the gang injunction include: violent and property victimization, perceived social disorder and general fear of crime. These measures were stated more generally to be consistent with concepts used in past research. The link between these variables and change in gang behavior was less direct. A decrease in gang activity was expected to influence these variables, but gangs were only one of many influences on them.

Seven items asked about possible victimization. "How many times over the last six months in your neighborhood: has someone damaged or vandalized your home, for example: writing on walls, broken windows, destroyed property; robbed or tried to steal something from you by force; physically attacked you or attempted to do so (including sexual attack); threatened or attacked you with a weapon?" "How many times has anyone stolen or tried to steal something belonging to you like your vehicle (including carjacking); something from inside your home or garage (not counting your vehicle); something outside in your yard or in your vehicle?" The three items measuring violent victimization were combined and scored as not at all or yes to at least one. The next four items measuring property victimization were scored the same way. For fear of crime, respondents were asked: "How much do you fear: that your home will be entered or damaged while you are away; that your car will be damaged or stolen; that you or a member of your family will be hurt by someone in the neighborhood; that you or a family

member will be hurt even if you stay indoors?” Responses were coded from 1 to 4 for not at all fearful, a little fearful, fearful, or very fearful. The four items scaled nicely with $\alpha = .88$ in Wave 1 and $.90$ in Wave 2. The measure of perceived social disorder was used previously in community surveys in Los Angeles (Maxson, et al. 1999) and was adapted from measures developed or used by previous researchers (Green Mazerolle and Ready, 1996; Skogan 1990). Thirteen possible problems that occur in some neighborhoods were listed, and respondents indicated how often each occurred in their neighborhood in the last six months on the same frequency scale described above. None of these items explicitly mentioned gang members and all were classified as social disorders.

Long-term outcomes

Several measures were included that were predicted from social disorganization theory to change in communities if gang injunctions reduce disorder and fear and increase involvement over time. The injunction might stimulate processes that influence neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective efficacy, neighborhood efficacy and coproduction with police. Social cohesion was measured using five items from Sampson, Radenbush and Earls' (1997) work in Chicago. The internal consistency of these items was acceptable with $\alpha = .71$ for Wave 1 and $.78$ for Wave 2. Informal social control was measured using four items asking how likely (on a five-point scale from very unlikely to very likely) would a person in the neighborhood do something if “someone let trash pile up on their yard or their steps; if young children were causing minor damage to a building in your neighborhood; if a suspicious stranger was hanging around the neighborhood; and if youth in the neighborhood were getting into trouble.” These items were correlated well in both waves; $\alpha = .83$ from Wave 1 and $.82$ for Wave 2. Following the conceptualization from Sampson, Radenbush and Earls (1997), collective efficacy was calculated by adding social cohesion and informal social control. Using the same response categories (a five-point scale from very unlikely to very likely), a single item tapped neighborhood efficacy: “If there is a problem in this neighborhood, how likely is it that people who live here can get it solved?” Coproduction with police was operationalized in two ways. First, respondents indicated how likely they were to call the police if a gang member was threatening someone outside of their home. Next, trust of the police was measured using three items (with a five-point response scale) from Maxson, et al. (1999) asking if police in the neighborhood could be trusted, treated people fairly, and were respectful of people. These items formed a scale with $\alpha = .86$ in each wave.

Knowledge and attitudes toward gangs and injunctions

In the Wave 2 survey, questions asking more directly about gangs and injunctions were added. Following the gang activities section (which measured gang intimidation and visibility), respondents were asked to “think back to this time last year” and indicate if there was “more or less gang activity in your neighborhood now than a year ago?” Near the end of the survey, the idea of civil gang injunctions was defined. “In a few neighborhoods in San Bernardino, the police have gone to court to get a civil injunction against a street gang. This means that members of a gang are forbidden to hang around in public together and have to stay away from places where they have caused problems in the past.” Respondents were then asked if they agreed or disagreed that “a gang injunction is a good way to make a neighborhood safer” and if “a gang injunction is going too far, it is not fair to gang members.”

A number of personal and demographic factors were measured to describe the respondents. These are described in Section F.

Pilot of survey instruments

The Wave 1 survey was pilot tested during July and August of 2000 in two areas identified by police informants as gang areas. One was an area where the SBPD had recently instituted a civil gang injunction (on the Sur Crazy Ones gang). The other was an area that had an identified gang, but no suppression activities had targeted that gang (Five Times gang). Minor revisions were made to improve residents' understanding of the items. The questions added to the Wave 2 survey to directly address knowledge and attitudes toward gangs and gang injunctions were pilot tested in the same two areas in January of 2003.

D. Survey Procedures

Community surveys are a unique application of more general survey techniques. Surveying in areas with high levels of disorder present particular challenges, including minimizing selection bias and response bias in the achieved samples. In such areas, response rates are often notoriously low; and distrust and apprehension among respondents is frequently high.

Survey mode and bias

Past research suggests that survey mode can have a strong influence on the results of community surveys (Dillman 2000; Hennigan, Maxson, Sloane and Ranney 2002). Community surveys often take place casually, sometimes in public arenas, often on doorsteps, over the phone or by mail. Despite promises of anonymity or confidentiality, the surveyor often has crucial identifying information (e.g., phone number, address, age and gender of the occupant) that could be used by unscrupulous persons for alternative purposes. The latter concern becomes more compelling as more and more people experience disingenuous surveys (fronts for marketing a product or political view point) and misuse of addresses and phone numbers given for a limited purpose.

In community surveys, respondents often respond to questions differently if asked in a personal interview or if asked using a self-administered format. There are several reasons for this. In our earlier work (Hennigan, et al. 2002) we directly compared responses from a self-administered mail survey and from a random digit dialing phone survey holding the survey instrument, sponsorship and areas sampled constant. Responses from the phone interview were more positive across many of the questions asked. Over the phone, fear and crime were low, police were trustworthy and neighbors could be trusted. Responses by mail from respondents with the same demographics in the same areas, appeared more "frank" in that higher levels of fear and distrust were reported. Response bias and selection bias were both possible explanations. Aquilino and LoSciuto's (1990) review of mode differences in drug use surveys show that self-presentational concerns can create a survey mode bias; persons are more forthcoming about sensitive information with a self-administered format than a personal interview format. Where responses from samples are compared, mode bias can also result from selection bias arising from different kinds of persons responding via self-administered mode (e.g., higher educated or older) than personal interview mode. Also, the work of Dillman and his colleagues (reviewed in Dillman 2000) shows that response bias due to survey modes is linked to perceptual and processing differences when hearing questions versus reading questions.

Hybrid model

For the current study, the research design required surveying in neighborhoods where residents are often fearful and feel intimidated by the rougher elements in their community. Past research suggests that a self-administered survey mode would increase a person's comfort with being frank in their responses. However, the response rate achieved in self-administered surveys, especially in high disorder neighborhoods, is often low, leaving open the possibility of selection bias. For this reason, a hybrid procedure was developed. After five contacts to every sampled address in support of the self-administered survey, a trained interviewer approached the remaining addresses for a doorstep-interview using the same survey protocol. The protocol and letters and reminders were designed from an exchange theory viewpoint in accordance with Dillman's earlier work (Dillman 1978, 1991).

The process began with a hand-signed letter on university letterhead addressed to residents who were randomly selected to be part of a survey on neighborhood crime and safety. The importance of the survey, the usefulness of the survey, the university sponsorship, a request for cooperation and assurance of confidentiality were each explained. The resident was informed that a survey packet would soon be brought to their house with a stamped mail-back envelope.

Within a week after the kick-off letter was delivered, a packet containing a cover letter, instructions as to which resident should respond (person over eighteen who most recently had a birthday), a copy of the survey, instructions with a sample question and a stamped mail-back envelope was left on the doorstep or handed to a resident of the selected household. All materials were written in simple and clear language translated into English and Spanish. In the following week, a postcard arrived by mail. This thank you or reminder postcard again emphasized the survey's sponsor as well as its importance and usefulness.

Two weeks after the postcard, a second survey packet was delivered to the chosen addresses that had not yet returned the survey. This packet was identical to the first with a revised cover letter and a one-dollar incentive enclosed. As before, this packet was handed to a resident, attached to the door or left on the doorstep. Finally, a third packet was mailed to those who had not responded. In Wave 1, this was mailed at the end of the entire data collection process while in Wave 2 it was mailed ten days after the second packet distribution was completed.

Three weeks after the second packet was distributed, trained interviewers were sent into each area to contact the residents of households who had not returned a completed survey. Interviewers continued to contact households until they completed the survey with the target respondent while distributing their efforts across all neighborhoods. Each interviewer was responsible for some addresses in each study neighborhood. They met weekly with their field supervisor, sometimes speaking on the phone during the week. Every few weeks, the entire group met to debrief, integrate new interviewers and refresh training. The face-to-face interviewing phase continued over an eight-week period.

Sampling

It is often more difficult to obtain complete up-to-date address lists in areas high in disorder. Our goal was to obtain a representative random sample of all households in the five study

neighborhoods. After exploring several sources of enumeration of residential addresses, we determined that the City of San Bernardino, Office of Management Information Services, could provide the most complete listing. We petitioned the city and were granted access to an electronic file of addresses, geographically organized in a manner that allowed us to produce address files for each area. However, when we checked the lists via windshield surveys of our own, we determined that many multi-family units were missing or in error. We inspected the properties in all the areas against the city address lists, and corrected or added unit designations for all multiple-family dwellings. At the same time, we identified apparently abandoned or uninhabitable dwellings. We noted and removed vacant lots, group housing situations (e.g., halfway houses, group homes) and an occasional commercial establishment. Addresses for newly constructed houses in one area were added. These additional efforts to improve the original address database resulted in a near-complete and current enumeration of residential addresses for sampling the first wave of survey households. Habitable though apparently vacant addresses were left in the sampling frame. Once the samples were drawn, in the course of the survey, field researchers were required to approach each household. Attempts to contact respondents in apparently vacant households were discontinued after two confirmations of vacancy (e.g., neighbor's confirmation, thorough physical inspection, repeated visits).

Table 2 reports the number of addresses available, along with the sample targets for Wave 1 and Wave 2. Study resources precluded surveying each household in these areas. We anticipated that the critical area comparison would be between the primary injunction Area I-H and the highly disordered Area C-H, so more addresses were targeted in those two study sites in Wave 1. The sample targets for Areas C-L and I-L reflect modifications in the site boundaries that occurred between Wave 1 and 2. The sampled households for each area were randomly selected from our improved residential address lists.

Table 2
Address Universe and Sample Numbers for Study Areas

AREA	UNIVERSE	ADDRESS SAMPLE	
		WAVE 1	WAVE 2
I-H	1284	570	666
C-H	581	450	525
C-P	615	300	525
I-L	218	118	149
C-L	131	61	130
TOTALS	2829	1499	1995

Prior to the start of the Wave 2 survey phase, we were better able to judge both survey costs and available resources. In an effort to maximize our power to detect modest changes in the dependent variables, the sample size was increased for each area.

E. Field Staff Recruitment, Training and Supervision.

Field researchers were recruited by posting notices in the community and at universities within easy driving distance of the neighborhoods being surveyed. For both survey waves, the interviewers hired were a mix of community residents (but not living in the neighborhoods studied) and college students. For Wave 1, nine part-time interviewers were hired; half were community residents, half from nearby universities; two-thirds were female. For Wave 2, fifteen part-time interviewers were hired; two were community residents, the rest were university students, more than half were female. For both waves, the interviewers ranged in age from twenty-one to forty and almost all were Hispanic, with a few black, and a few white. All interviewers received four to eight hours of training (depending on the phases in which they participated) with refreshers approximately every three weeks. For each wave, a different field supervisor (first a graduate student in planning and second a graduate student in public policy) who lived close to the community was hired to meet with the field research staff weekly, to be available by phone and to assist in collecting and distributing materials.

The two phases of data collection—the self-administered phase and the face-to-face interview phase—were managed in the same way for Wave 1 and Wave 2. Training for the first phase covered procedures for distributing the self-administered survey packets. Methods for approaching houses were developed and shared. In the areas surveyed here, approaching houses was particularly challenging. Front yard fences surrounded many houses, often with a dog inside the fence to discourage intruders. Approaching these houses in order to speak with the residents required persistence and care. Field staff was trained in a step-by-step approach to gain the attention of household residents in a safe and respectful manner.

Field researchers traveled in pairs working opposite sides of the street and were not permitted to enter any house or to work after dusk. They attempted to contact a resident in order to hand the survey packet directly to them, remind them of the explanatory letter distributed the week before and to reinforce that the target respondent was the resident of the household over eighteen years old who mostly recently had a birthday. Field researchers used standard approach language: “I am from the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Southern California. We are conducting a neighborhood survey about quality of life, including safety and crime. Your address was randomly selected for this survey.”

Training for the second phase interviews emphasized confidentiality, gaining the cooperation of the target respondent, developing trust and rapport, maintaining control of the interview, guiding the respondent to use only the allowed response set, practicing how to avoid refusals and leave open an opportunity to return later. In both English and Spanish, interviewers practiced posing the questions verbatim and responding to inquiries in a standard way. All of the face-to-face interviews were conducted on the doorstep or in the front yard of the respondent’s home. Interviewers worked to create a situation where other persons could not overhear the respondent, and to cut the interview off to return later if necessary to maintain confidentiality. In the field, researchers carried badges identifying them as researchers from USC. They held a notebook with a large USC sticker that contained a confidentiality agreement and a letter from the principal investigators.

F. Response Rates and Comparison of the Two Samples

As noted in the prior section, modest variations in sampling and data collection procedures were introduced between the two survey waves. The sample size was increased and more effort was expended in Wave 2 to obtain interviews from respondents who did not return the survey by mail. After making final adjustments for uninhabitable dwellings, vacancies and incorrect addresses,¹¹ the response rate for the Wave 1 survey was sixty-four percent and, for Wave 2, seventy-three percent, among all areas included in this report. Table 3 displays the adjusted response rate for each area and survey period. The highest rates are evident in the least disordered community (Area C-L), but in no case did the response rate fall below sixty percent. Despite repeated efforts by field staff to contact household residents, it was sometimes difficult to catch an adult at home. Refusals to participate in the study were rare. The refusal rates were 4.6% (Wave 1) and 6.6% (Wave 2).

Table 3
Response Rates for Study Areas

AREA	WAVE 1 (n=1238)		WAVE 2 (n=1691)	
	RATE	# OF RESPONSES	RATE	# OF RESPONSES
I-H	64.1%	287	71.0%	384
C-H	61.9%	227	75.6%	322
C-P	66.0%	169	67.8%	312
I-L	66.7%	72	77.0%	107
C-L	71.2%	42	83.2%	104
OVERALL	64.3%	797	72.6%	1229

There is a recognized trend in the United States and elsewhere that participation in surveys is declining (see de Leeuw and de Heer 2002 for a recent review). The achieved response rates in this study are in line with those achieved in other published studies of residential households in minority and economically depressed neighborhoods (Groves and Couper 1998; Johnson, O'Rourke, Burris and Owens 2002). Because survey procedures were modified slightly for Wave 2, we were concerned that comparisons over the two time periods could be biased if different types of people responded in Wave 2 than in Wave 1. Accordingly, we compared the demographic characteristics of the achieved samples in the two survey periods for each study area. The respondent characteristics investigated included:

¹¹ Even after our efforts to refine the original address list, field staff identified abandoned and vacant dwellings. The ability to survey an address changed between the two survey points. Addresses determined to be vacant in Wave 1 were attempted in Wave 2. Over all the areas, the loss of addresses due to these factors, from the population listing from which the sample was drawn, was 17.4% in Wave 1 and 15.2% in Wave 2. The loss from Area C-L was markedly less (three to four percent) than other areas in both waves; the range of loss across wave among the other four areas was seven percent (Area I-L, Wave 2) to twenty-one percent (Area I-H, Wave 1). Within each area, address loss did not vary substantially between waves.

- age (6 categories),
- race/ethnicity (4 categories),
- gender,
- educational attainment (5 categories),
- annual income (5 categories),
- home ownership,
- length of time living in the neighborhood (4 categories), and
- length of time living in the US (3 categories).

Table 4 shows the distributions of the Wave 1 and Wave 2 achieved samples on each demographic variable for each area. Chi-squares tests were run on the categorical variables comparing the Wave 1 to Wave 2 distributions on gender, ethnicity, education level, and homeownership. Significant differences were found in only in Area I-L, where twenty-one percent more respondents rented rather than owned their homes in Wave 2 than in Wave 1 ($X^2=8.49$; $df=1$; $p=.004$). T-tests were run to test for differences between the survey waves on the ordinal variables including age, household income, years living in the area, and years living in the country. On these analyses, no differences were found from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in Area C-H or C-L. In Area I-H, only income varied ($F=4.143$; $df=1,613$; $p=.042$). The percentage of respondents with incomes less than \$20,000 shifted from sixty-two percent in Wave 1 to fifty percent in Wave 2. Similarly, in C-P, income was higher in Wave 2 than in Wave 1 ($F=6.935$; $df=1,439$; $p=.009$). Here the percentage of respondents with incomes less than \$30,000 shifted from eighty percent in Wave 1 down to sixty-seven percent in Wave 2. In Area I-L, the length of time respondents had lived in the neighborhood varied. Among Wave 1 respondents, thirty-one percent had lived in the neighborhood less than five years and among Wave 2 respondents, fifty-four percent had lived there less than five years.

Overall, few differences were found from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in the areas studied; just four of the forty tests (eight variables in five areas) produced significant differences. Two involved modest increases in income in areas I-H and C-P over time. We noticed non-significant trends toward higher income in Wave 2 in two other areas as well, in C-H and C-L. One possible explanation is that household income increased slightly over the two years between the surveys. The other two significant differences found were both in Area I-L. In contrast with the other areas surveyed, the demographic differences between waves in this area stand out as being more substantial, and in the opposite direction than those found in other areas. Here the shifts between waves were generally toward more renters and less time living in the neighborhood in Wave 2 than in Wave 1. We have no way of knowing if this shift was due to nonresponse or to real changes in this area between the surveys. In either case, a plausible alternative interpretation of any changes observed across time in this area is a demographic shift in responders.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

Comparison of Wave 1 sample to 2000 Census

Census data can be used to assess whether the achieved sample characteristics in Wave 1 roughly approximate the population it was designed to represent. We employed a hybrid method of data collection to try to minimize the selection bias generated by the tendency for mail surveys to capture more educated people, and those more willing to respond to surveys in general. Our ability to conduct a direct comparison to census data is limited to the five demographic variables for which there is a good match between our measurement categories and the census survey: age, gender and education level of the respondent, home ownership, and the respondent's length of residency. Gender comparisons are rough approximations because the census data available are reported for the entire population whereas our respondents were limited to adults. Our residential stability measure asked about length of time lived in the neighborhood, whereas the census asks if the respondent has moved within the last five years. We selected the Wave 1 sample as the best comparison because it was conducted just after the 2000 Census. Finally, the neighborhoods selected for our study are only roughly approximated by census block boundaries.

The distributions on the demographic variables for the five study areas are displayed in Table 5. Statistical comparisons of the two data sources reveal significant differences in all five areas on gender and educational attainment, and in a few areas on the other three variables. In all areas, survey respondents are disproportionately female and more educated when compared to the census population. This has implications for more limited generalizability of our findings to males and less educated persons. Beyond that, only scattered differences between the Census and the Wave 1 achieved sample were found. In one area, C-P, older individuals are more likely to respond to the survey. Homeowners disproportionately participated in the study in two areas (C-H and I-H). In two areas (C-H and I-L), survey respondents were less likely to have lived in the neighborhood for less than five years, but the census incorporates any move whereas our survey counted only moves from outside the neighborhood. In most areas, the match on age, homeownership and residential stability between the Wave 1 and the census population was acceptable.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

G. Data Analysis Plan

The primary hypotheses predicted that residents in the injunction Area I-H experienced a decrease (or less of an increase) from the first wave (before) to the second wave (after the injunction) on five immediate outcome variables relative to the high disorder comparison Area C-H. Differences in the change over time in these two areas were compared by examining their interaction in an ANOVA using wave (before, after) and area (Area I-H, Area C-H) as factors. Significant interactions in the predicted direction were interpreted as support for the primary hypotheses. These analyses were repeated comparing change in the secondary injunction area (I-L) to change in its control, the low disorder comparison area (C-L).

The same tests were repeated for the each of the intermediate and longer-term outcomes, first between the two high disorder areas and then between the two low disorder areas. Though the analyses were conducted separately for the high and low disorder areas, the means for all five areas were plotted together to show the overall pattern of changes in these neighborhoods.

For the next analyses, we assumed that residents in the two territorial gang neighborhoods that had injunctions were characterized by similar neighborhood experiences prior to implementation of the injunction. Both areas, as described by police informants, had been high crime, active gang territories. The levels of outcomes reported in the second wave of the survey were compared between Area C-P that had now been under an injunction for five years and Area I-H that experienced an injunction just six months prior to Wave 2. It was expected that the long-term effects were unlikely to have developed in the recent injunction Area I-H, but would show some evidence of higher levels in Area C-P. These effects were tested using t-tests and chi-square analyses.

Finally, a series of questions asked directly about the respondents' knowledge and attitudes toward gangs and injunctions only in the Wave 2 survey. Apparent differences were tested using t-tests and chi-square analyses as needed.

H. The Plausibility of Methodological Artifacts

We need to consider possible alternative explanations for any findings in support of the hypotheses that may arise from methodological artifacts rather than actual shifts in the experiences or opinions of neighborhood residents from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Two possible alternative explanations linked to survey mode differences arising from the two phases of the hybrid survey model and an issue arising from nonresponse rates from Wave 1 to Wave 2 are discussed here.

Differences in response by survey mode—i.e., self-administered (SA) mode versus face-to-face (FTF) mode—were present in this study as have been found in past research. We anticipated that survey mode would be correlated with the outcomes. In the past, surveys completed in the FTF mode generally reflect a more positive view of safety and neighborhood characteristics than those completed in the SA mode. While this affects the absolute level of experiences or opinions reported, this does not by itself cause a problem in interpreting changes over time, unless a) the nature or magnitude of the mode differences changes over time, or b) the proportion of surveys

completed by FTF mode shifts from wave to wave differently across areas. The first issue was examined by running ANOVA with mode (SA or FTF), wave (1 or 2) and high disorder area (I-H, C-H, C-P) as factors on all outcomes, followed by the same analyses run for respondents from the two low disorder areas. The results confirmed the expected main effects for mode in analyses with residents of the high disorder areas (Fs ranged from 12.23 on violent victimization to 134.21 on perceived disorder) on all but three variables (see police patrolling, willingness to call the police, and trust of police). In the low disorder areas, the expected main effects were evident (Fs ranged from 5.14 on belief the neighborhood can solve its problems to 20.90 on fear of crime) on all but four variables (see gang members hanging out, violent victimization, willingness to call the police, and trust in the police).

The crucial question here was whether survey mode interacted with wave, that is, if there was any evidence that the strong mode effects found operated differently in Wave 1 than in Wave 2. There were no interactions between survey mode and wave on any of the outcome variables in the analyses run using the high or low disorder areas. This suggests that mode effects, while present, do not shift over time in ways that would compromise our findings.

However, there were some three-way interactions (mode by wave by area) that need further consideration. In the high disorder areas, there were significant three-way interactions involving wave, mode, and areas on four outcome variables (seeing graffiti, fear of gang members, perceived level of social disorder, and violent victimization) and on three outcome variables (see gang members hanging out, seeing graffiti, and willingness to call the police) in the low disorder areas. Triple interactions may or may not threaten our interpretation of the findings, depending on the direction of the interactions across wave from area to area. After the findings are presented in the next section, we return to these interactions and consider their implications for the interpretation of our findings.

Turning now to the second issue, did the proportion of surveys completed by FTF mode shift from wave to wave *differently* across areas? Given the strong and consistent pattern that FTF respondents reported more favorable experiences and opinions than their SA counterparts, it is critical that the proportions of FTF respondents in each wave be similar across the areas being compared. If the proportion of surveys completed in one mode or the other differs from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in a study area, shifts in response due to mode differences might be misinterpreted as real shifts in opinion. To test this possible alternative explanation, we carefully examined the survey mode proportions across wave and area. These proportions are plotted in Figure 1, which shows a similar increase in the number of FTF survey completions from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (an average of fifteen percent more) for all areas except one. In Area C-L alone, the proportion of FTF survey completions did not increase from Wave 1 to Wave 2. This suggests that analyses involving Area C-L must be interpreted in light of this methodological artifact, and comparisons of the other areas across wave are free of this particular confound.

Finally, selection bias due to *differential* nonresponse is another possible methodological artifact that needs to be examined. The area with the largest difference in response rates from Wave 1 to Wave 2 was Area C-H, where the response rate for Wave 1 was sixty-two percent and for Wave 2 was seventy-six percent (see Table 3). Similarly, in each of the other areas except Area C-P, the Wave 2 achieved response rate was significantly larger than the Wave 1 achieved sample. As

discussed above (Section III F; see Table 4), small demographic differences were apparent in two high disorder areas on household income, and in the low disorder Area I-L on years living in the neighborhood and home ownership. Demographic shifts between Wave 1 and Wave 2 pose a threat to interpretation of the findings if the characteristics that vary are associated with the outcomes tested. We examined the correlation between the immediate and intermediate outcomes and the three demographic variables of concern. Each demographic variable had low but significant correlations with the outcomes; household income (r ranging from $-.01$ to $-.10$), years living in the neighborhood (r ranging from $-.06$ to $.09$) and homeownership ($-.03$ to $-.16$). To control for possible artifacts arising from these minor demographic shifts, the primary analyses reported in the next section were tested within levels of income for the high disorder areas, and within homeownership and length of residence in the neighborhood for the low disorder areas, to see if these factors complicate the interpretation of the predicted wave by area effects. We consider the implications of these supplemental analyses following the presentation of tests of the primary hypotheses.

IV. Results

A. Immediate Outcomes

We predicted that the gang injunction would have an impact on gang and police visibility almost immediately, and consequently have an impact on the level of intimidation by gang members and the level of fear of gang members experienced by residents relatively soon after the injunction was filed and enforced. The analyses supported these hypotheses. Table 6 shows the results of comparisons between the two high disorder neighborhoods, one with the Flats injunction filed after Wave 1 and six months before Wave 2; and the other matched on the level of social disorder. As predicted, respondents living in the high disorder injunction Area I-H reported seeing gang members hanging out in their neighborhoods less often ($F=4.38$; $df=1,1189$; $p=.037$) and seeing police patrolling more often ($F=6.08$; $df=1,1202$; $p=.014$) than respondents in the high disorder comparison Area C-H after the injunction than before. In reference to the response categories, these findings shown in Table 6 translate into a net shift of about fifteen percent fewer respondents seeing gang members hanging out regularly in Area I-H relative to Area C-H and a net shift of about nine percent more respondents seeing police patrolling in Area I-H relative to Area C-H. While graffiti decreased in both areas, there was no significant difference between the two areas on change in the level of graffiti from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Figures 2, 3 and 4 plot the mean levels of gang visibility, police patrolling and graffiti for each area across Wave 1 and Wave 2.

Gang intimidation and gang fear were predicted to decrease after the injunction. As predicted, fewer Area I-H respondents reported feeling intimidated by gang members ($F=5.810$; $df=1,1194$; $p=.016$) or feared a confrontation with a gang member ($F=10.32$; $df=1,1192$; $p=.001$) relative to Area C-H respondents after the injunction than before. The area means are given in Table 6 and plotted in Figures 5 and 6. These findings translate into a net shift of thirteen percent fewer respondents experiencing intimidation in Area I-H compared to Area C-H, and a net shift of twelve percent fewer respondents experiencing more than a little fear in Area I-H relative to Area C-H.

Similar analyses compared the secondary injunction Area I-L to its comparison Area C-L on the five immediate outcomes. Table 7 shows that respondents in the secondary injunction area reported seeing more officers patrolling ($F=5.94$; $df=1,319$; $p=.015$) but also reported *more* rather than less gang visibility ($F=5.97$; $df=1,315$; $p=.015$) than the low disorder comparison Area C-L. The two low disorder areas did not vary from wave-to-wave on any of the three other immediate outcome measures. Change in graffiti, gang fear and gang intimidation in Area I-L were not significantly different from the control Area C-L. The means for these areas are also plotted in Figures 2 through 6. Looking at both high disorder and both low disorder areas together we see that on four of the five immediate outcomes the means in the two injunction areas are converging over time, while the means in the two comparison areas remain parallel or are diverging. This alerts us to the possibility that the low disorder - secondary injunction area may be experiencing a different impact of the injunction. Given the post hoc creation of the secondary injunction area, one wonders if the increase in gang members hanging around happened before or after the injunction was filed, a question that cannot be answered with the data we have at hand.

B. Intermediate Outcomes

The implementation of the gang injunction was also predicted to affect several intermediate outcomes if the influence of the injunction on fear and disorder was strong and pervasive. These outcomes are less immediate because changes in gang behavior are just one of many factors in neighborhoods that may influence fear of crime, perceived level of disorder, and victimization. The analyses summarized in the bottom of Table 6 showed little carry over of the injunction's impact to these more general outcomes. Residents of the primary injunction Area I-H reported less fear of crime than residents in its comparison area, but no significant differences on perceived social disorder or victimization.

Table 7 shows the results on these more general outcomes in the secondary injunction area and its comparison. Both of these areas were low in disorder at the time of the first survey wave, but Area I-L had increased in perceived social disorder and property victimization in survey Wave 2 relative to its comparison Area C-L. The other two intermediate variables showed non significant trends in the same direction ($p < .11$). These patterns are apparent in the plots of the means on the four intermediate variables shown in Figures 7 through 10.

As before, what is striking in the plots is the convergence of the levels of fear, perceptions of social disorder and victimization levels in the primary and secondary injunction areas in Wave 2, against the large differences maintained between the comparison areas across the waves. Considering all of the intermediate outcomes, this is the same overall pattern of change in these neighborhoods from eighteen months before the injunction to six months after the injunction, but fewer of the trends are statistically significant. While conditions appeared to improve in the primary injunction area, conditions declined in the secondary injunction area against comparisons that maintained roughly the same spread between them over time. Did these consistent patterns extend to the long-term variables?

C. Long-term Outcomes

The possible long-term outcomes that were measured include neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective efficacy, perceived neighborhood efficacy and indicators of police/community co-production—willingness to call and trust the police. As a group, these are outcomes that might be influenced by changes set in motion by successful gang injunctions if the community became empowered as a result of changes in disorder, fear and safety. However, tests failed to reveal significant changes in the predicted direction on any of the long-term outcomes in the injunction areas relative to their comparison areas. The variable means and results of the statistical tests are recorded in Table 8 for Areas I-H and C-H and in Table 9 for Areas I-L and C-L.

Contrary to predictions, perceived neighborhood efficacy decreased in the secondary injunction area relative to its comparison ($F=4.28$; $df=1, 315$; $p=.039$). Residents were less inclined to believe that the community could solve its own problems after the injunction than before. Taken with the results of analyses in these areas above, lower neighborhood efficacy is consistent with the observed increase in perceptions of higher gang visibility and disorder in the secondary injunction area after Wave 1. Given the unplanned lengthy gap between the first wave and the

implementation of the injunction, definitive interpretation of these shifts is inappropriate. One speculation is that the changes observed took place before the injunction due to shifts in gang activity that also influenced the decision by the police to include this area in the injunction. An alternate speculation is that the police realized that a gang injunction would likely displace activity from the primary gang area to this secondary area. The community survey data could perhaps reflect the displacement of gang activities from the primary injunction area.

The inclusion of Area C-P in our research design provided an additional opportunity to shed some light on the impact of gang injunctions on these long-term outcomes. Area C-P is home to a notorious territorial gang that has had an injunction in effect over the five years preceding Wave 2. If one accepts the assumption that the gangs in Area C-P and Area I-H (territories of two long-standing Latino gangs in close proximity) had had similar impacts on their communities up to the time of the injunctions, it is interesting to compare the levels of outcomes in Wave 2, particularly the long-term outcomes in these two areas: one five years after an injunction and the other six months after an injunction. The Wave 2 means and the results of t-tests comparing the immediate and intermediate outcomes in Area I-H to Area C-P are given in Table 10. Not unexpectedly, none of the immediate and only one of the intermediate outcomes (property victimization is lower in Area C-P) in these areas differ in Wave 2.

The findings on the long-term outcomes in Areas I-H and C-P are included in Table 11. Four of the six longer-term outcomes show significant differences between the two areas, with more favorable conditions in Area C-P. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that neighborhood social cohesion, collective efficacy, neighborhood efficacy and willingness to call the police increased in Area C-P after the gang injunction had been in place over a long period of time. Though consistent with our hypotheses, the research design does not permit us to definitively rule out plausible alternative interpretations.

D. Attitudes and Knowledge of Gang and Injunctions

Direct questions about residents' perceptions of gangs and gang injunctions were asked in the second survey wave. Residents were asked if they thought there was more or less gang activity in their neighborhood now than there was one year before. Table 12 and Figure 11 show the responses given in the areas. About half of the residents in each of the high disorder areas report seeing little or no change. Of the rest, more residents report a decrease and fewer report an increase ($X^2 = 19.18$; $df=4$; $p=.001$) in the injunction Area I-H (thirty-two percent to fourteen percent) and the prior injunction Area C-P (thirty-six percent to twelve percent) than in the comparison Area C-H (twenty-seven to twenty-four percent). This is consistent with the shifts in attitudes inferred from comparing responses from the survey before and after the injunction (reported above). Interestingly, there were no differences in the perception that gang activity had changed over the last year between residents in Areas I-L and C-L.

Finally, a simple definition of a civil gang injunction was given and respondents were informed that their city had obtained gang injunctions in some neighborhoods. Respondents were asked how they viewed injunctions. At least seventy-five percent of residents in each of the study areas agreed that civil gang injunctions were a good way to improve safety in neighborhoods. As Table 13 indicates, there were no significant differences in approval across the study areas. Also in the

table are responses to the question of whether gang injunctions go too far and are not fair to gang members. Again the responses did not vary significantly across the areas, with eight percent to fifteen percent of the respondents endorsing this point of view.

E. Qualifications to the Findings

In the methods section, the impact of survey mode on responses was examined within the high disorder areas and the low disorder areas. We reported significant three-way interactions (mode by wave by area) on four outcome variables in the high disorder areas, but we can now see that only one of these involved an outcome on which we found the predicted wave-by-area interaction—gang fear. We looked closely at this triple interaction to see if it would qualify our findings. Analyses run separately within survey mode confirm a significant area by wave interaction within the FTF mode ($F=13.75$; $df= 1,508$; $p=.000$) but not within the SA mode, where the means were in the right direction but did not reach statistical significance. We concluded that the changes we found on gang fear in the primary injunction area relative to its comparison area were strongest among residents responding via the FTF survey mode. Similarly, in the low disorder areas, we followed up on one triple interaction with survey mode with a significant area by wave interaction—on gang members hanging out. We looked closely at this triple interaction to see if it would qualify our findings. Analyses run separately within survey mode confirm a significant area by wave interaction in the FTF mode ($F= 10.87$; $df=1,111$; $p=.001$) but not in the SA mode, where the means were again clearly in the right direction but not significantly different. The changes we found on gang members hanging out in the low disorder areas were strongest in the FTF survey mode.

Finally, we examined the results of the primary analyses with an eye for selection bias due to differential response. The ANOVAs with significant findings in the high disorder areas were repeated adding the income (high or low) as a factor. The objective was to test for interactions that might limit or qualify our results. Household income did not interact with pattern of changes across waves found in the high disorder areas. The findings held across income levels. Similarly follow-up analyses in the low disorder areas added home ownership and living in the neighborhood more or less than 5 years to the analyses. The findings were replicated with one exception. The increase in perceived level of social disorder in Area I-L relative to Area C-L was reported only by renters, not by homeowners.

V. Conclusions

This study employed a quasi-experimental design to assess the impact of a civil gang injunction on community residents. A survey of 797 household residents in five areas that varied in levels of disorder and exposure to the intervention was conducted about eighteen months prior to the issuance of the injunction. About six months following the initiation of implementation, 1229 household residents in the same areas were surveyed and the pre- and post-intervention responses were compared. A hybrid form of self-administration and face-to-face interviewing was used to optimize response rates.

The research design predicted immediate, intermediate and long-term effects, according to different phases of implementation. We anticipated immediate effects in gang and police visibility, incidence of gang intimidation and fear of gang confrontation. Intermediate effects examined were fear of crime, neighborhood social disorder and both violent and property crime victimization. While the six-month follow-up period did not portend impact on more stable features of neighborhoods, we also tested for effects on neighborhood social cohesion and informal social control, collective and neighborhood efficacy, and the crime co-production indicators of willingness to call and trust in the police.

A. Summary and Discussion of Findings

Notwithstanding the limitations of the study methods, our analyses provide evidence of the predicted short-term effects of a CGI on the primary neighborhood targeted. Consistent with police informants' reports of the implementation of the intervention, our surveys of community residents reveal positive evidence of implementation in the increased visibility of police patrols and in less gang presence in the neighborhood, as compared with changes in the primary control area. Furthermore, fewer residents report acts of gang intimidation and residents report less fear of confrontation with gang members. No differences in change in the presence of gang graffiti were detected in the primary target area relative to the high disorder comparison area.

Police reported no territorial gang presence in the primary comparison area, but residents there noted substantial gang activity in the baseline survey. As crime increased in the city over the two-year period between the surveys, gang fear and intimidation increased in the disordered control area, but not in the neighborhood with the new injunction. The level of police patrol visibility remained stable in the new injunction areas, but decreased in all comparison areas. The increased relative commitment of police resources appeared to yield benefits to the primary injunction area: immediate benefits accrued to residents' experience of gang intimidation and fear of gangs.

These benefits to the primary injunction area, however, did not extend to the intermediate or long-term outcome indicators. Only in fear of crime did the primary injunction area show a relative decrease. No significant relative changes were observed on the other intermediate outcomes, perceived social disorder or crime victimization. On the long-term outcome indicators, we found little evidence that immediate effects on residents translated into larger improvements in neighborhood quality (i.e., neighborhood social cohesion, informal social control, collective

efficacy and police/community relationships), although reductions in fear of crime and gang visibility, fear and intimidation may be precursors to such change in the long run.¹²

We found tantalizing hints of such changes in the comparison of the primary, new injunction area with a contiguous area in which an injunction had been implemented five years prior to the second survey. At the time of that survey, the two areas had similar levels of gang visibility, fear and intimidation, but the longstanding injunction area showed favorable levels of social cohesion, neighborhood and collective efficacy, and willingness to call the police if a gang member threatened residents. If we assume similarity between the two areas in these neighborhood characteristics at baseline prior to either injunction, these results are consistent with the view that community improvements will accrue once fear and intimidation are mitigated by implementation of a civil gang injunction.

Taken together, these two sets of comparisons suggest that injunctions can have a positive impact on communities. This study design does not support strong causal inferences, but our findings lead to some speculation regarding processes of community change. This study did not assess the impact on the individual gang members named in this injunction—we have to presume that the reduced gang presence and intimidation perceived by the targeted community residents was the result of either deterrence and/or individuation processes spawned by the intervention. The unanticipated delay in obtaining the Flats injunction precluded a strong test of long-term community effects, but the comparison between the two injunction communities is consistent with an interpretation of community change: willingness to engage with police in crime control efforts, a perspective that neighbors can and will intervene to resolve incipient crime problems, and greater social bonds among neighbors.

The unexpected expansion of the territory covered by the Flats injunction provided the opportunity to investigate the impact on a less disordered neighborhood, with considerably less gang activity. Our comparison of this secondary injunction area with a similarly low disorder, contiguous community produced results that caution those who would promulgate the efficacy of gang injunctions in diverse settings. Despite increased visibility of police patrols, the secondary injunction area evidenced negative impacts, relative to its control: more, not less, gang visibility, social disorder and property victimization, and less faith that a neighborhood can solve its own problems. There are at least four viable explanations for these findings.

First is a concern that factors that might exacerbate gang activity in any community increased in the secondary injunction area after the Wave 1 survey. Our analysis of the demographic profiles of the Wave 1 and Wave 2 survey samples identified this area as the only one that experienced substantial demographic change, and in the opposite direction of that found in other areas. In the secondary injunction area, the demographic shifts were generally toward more renters and less residential longevity in the neighborhood in Wave 2 than in Wave 1. Our controls for these

¹² These results were immune to several supplemental tests of methodological artifact. Although changes in gang fear were stronger among residents who were interviewed in person, the same trend was evident among those who self-administered the survey. Previous research would lead us to predict that people would downplay a sensitive issue like gang fear in a face-to-face interview setting. Overall, these additional methodological tests lend more confidence to these findings.

demographic changes did not change our conclusions¹³ but such transitions may foster neighborhood dynamics that increase gang activity, independent of intervention efforts.

Second, as the police anticipated, this secondary injunction area may have been the locale for the displacement of gang activity from the primary injunction area, and the implementation of the intervention may have been weaker in this area. Recall that this area was surveyed at baseline (Wave 1) as a comparison area, potentially vulnerable to displacement and its inclusion in the injunction was a surprise to us. Further, the location of police contacts with named gang members took place almost exclusively in the primary injunction area and not in the secondary area (see Map 3). We cannot determine whether the increased gang activity was due to displacement from the primary injunction area, or to a third possibility, the unanticipated consequences of increased suppression activities

This third view is that police over-reached by including this neighborhood with less gang activity and less social disorder in the injunction. Suppression activities may have backfired by building cohesiveness or oppositional defiance (Sanchez-Jankowski 1991) among the targeted gang members who lived or were active in this area.

Finally, these negative results may be a reflection of weaknesses in the study design or method that affected the secondary area comparisons in particular. As noted in Table 2, the sample sizes in these two areas were about one-third the size of the other areas. This was due to the recalibration of study areas following the final selection of the injunction territory by the police. Also, we noted that the secondary comparison area had a far lower proportion of face-to-face interviews in Wave 2 than in any other area (see Figure 1). These weaknesses, coupled with the unique shift in the demographic profile of the secondary injunction area (i.e. more renters, less longevity in the neighborhood), make us particularly cautious about drawing broad generalizations about the negative outcomes detected in the secondary injunction area. On one hand, the results observed in the secondary injunction area may portend damaging effects of injunctions on certain types of communities or a displacement effect. On the other hand is the possibility that these results stem from methodological artifacts in the research process.

B. Study Limitations and Implications for Further Research

Very little empirical research has been produced to investigate the impact of injunctions, despite their increasing popularity. This study is the first that examines potential effects on community residents. Future studies that replicate the essential method of this research are needed in a variety of contexts: different injunction forms and implementation procedures, different gang structures, different law enforcement and court venues and different community environments. Given the expanding interest in this type of intervention, it is striking that so little sound information is available regarding the effects on gang members or communities. A primary limitation of this study derives from its unique quality: any generalization of findings from one study of one injunction on one gang is clearly premature. The effects detected in this study

¹³ The only difference was observed in the homeownership category on the intermediate outcome of perceived level of social disorder. The increase in social disorder in Area I-L relative to Area C-L was observed only among renters.

reflect modest improvements in only the primary injunction area, and these may not be replicated in future studies.

The study design could be improved substantially by the inclusion of other data collection components. An ethnographic component could address the activities and group processes in the gang targeted for an injunction before, during and after implementation. Structured interviews with gang members, coupled with ethnographic field observation methods, are the optimal approach to investigating how injunctions do or do not work. A spatial analysis of gang and nongang crime in the targeted and comparison communities could inform the discourse on injunction impact and displacement. The time frame from baseline through post-injunction observations should be expanded to observe processes that evolve over time.

An expanded longitudinal survey design is necessary to trace the long-term impacts of injunctions on community residents. Subsequent survey waves, conducted on an annual basis, could chart changes in community characteristics, such as social cohesion and informal social control, and neighborhood efficacy and policy/community relationships, that might be precipitated by the injunction intervention. The tenets of community social disorganization theory suggest that interventions like injunctions can produce positive community change and these must be measured over an extended period of time. The tentative interpretation of differences in the new injunction area as compared with the previous injunction neighborhood would be ameliorated if these communities were surveyed over a longer period.

Other study limitations derive from this research design. Just one area was available for each comparison with an injunction area. Our positive conclusions rest on differences detected between the primary injunction area and one similarly disordered comparison area. Visual inspection of the trends in the graphs provided suggest that the observed differences were more the result of negative changes in the comparison area than positive changes in the injunction area. The neighborhood that was selected as a comparison area possibly suffered from situational or idiosyncratic assaults on community health. An optimal research design would include several comparison areas that mimicked the intervention area at the baseline survey point.

C. Study Implications for Gang Intervention

The civil gang injunction against the Verdugo Flats gang in San Bernardino appears to have decreased the visibility of gangs, episodes of gang intimidation, fear of gang confrontations and fear of crime in the targeted community. These effects are modest, but encouraging for practitioners wishing to experiment with this gang intervention strategy. Coupled with the findings from another study that found reductions in violent crime levels in injunction areas (Grogger 2002), this study suggests that strategic suppression of gang member activities may translate into modest improvements in community safety and well-being. We recommend further experimentation with this strategy, if such efforts are coupled with a program evaluation that continues to build on the assessment of the intervention's effects.

The study findings offer some guidelines for further refinement of the CGI strategy, and also recommendations for restraint or caution in some aspects. The negative results that emerged in the secondary injunction area argue for caution to be exercised when the geographic area to be

covered by an injunction is determined. Law enforcement and judicial practitioners should review spatial depictions of gang activity and crime to insure that the area within which individual conduct is to be constrained is limited to spaces most often frequented by gang members. There is no evidence that expanding the geographic reach of the injunction reduces the displacement of gang activity.

The Verdugo Flats gang—and most of the gangs included in the injunctions studied by Grogger (2002)—is a traditional, territorial gang. This type of gang is assumed by practitioners to be most appropriate for injunctions, due to the geographic limitations imposed (Maxson, Hennigan and Sloane 2003). An alternative argument can be made for the viability of injunctions against specialty drug gangs, because they are more organized and have clear leadership (Klein 1995). Until more is known about the mechanisms whereby injunctions reduce gang activity, it is advisable to limit the strategy to the gang forms that have produced positive results thus far.

This study found tentative support for salutary injunction effects on community residents and neighborhoods. Theory and research on communities suggest that these effects could be substantially increased if injunction development and implementation engaged community residents in a process of neighborhood empowerment and improvement. Social networks and both formal and informal community organizations provide social capital through which neighborhoods can continue on a positive trajectory.

Finally, the positive effects of injunctions might be expanded if this strategy was coupled with the provision of skill-development and treatment resources for targeted gang members. The serving of injunction papers may open a window of opportunity for change. Offering a carrot of positive opportunity for vocational, educational or personal growth with the stick of promised incarceration for violation of the injunction prohibitions may provide more immediate and long lasting change in negative gang behavior than that obtained from an injunction implemented alone.

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Interviews were conducted with the following individuals:

David Demerjian	Hardcore Gang Division, LA County Prosecutor's Office	3 Aug 1998
Commander D. Koenig, Martin Vranicar and Jule Bishop	LA City Attorney's office	27 Aug 1998
Deanna Castorena	Hardcore Gang Division, LA County Prosecutor's Office	23 Sept 1998
Jule Bishop	LA City Attorney's Office	25 Sept 1998
Jacquelyn Jackson	Deputy District Atty, SAGE, Compton	1 Oct 1998 and 2 Nov 1998
Cheryl C. Kersey	Deputy District Atty, San Bernardino	26 Oct 1999 and 8 Nov 1999
Jolena Barnes	City Attorney, San Bernardino	8 Dec 1999
Sgt. R.C. Garcia	SBPD	8 Dec 1999
Paula Coleman	Former City Atty, San Bernardino	29 Dec 1999
Detectives Jim Keesling and Tony Gorrell	SBPD	1 Feb 2000
Sgt. R.C. Garcia and Lt. Steve Klettenberg	SBPD	15 May 2000
Professor Larry Gaines	California State University at San Bernardino	24 May 2000
Lt. William D. Smith	SBPD	24 May 2000
Sgt. Bill Harps and seven officers	SBPD MET office	24 May 2000
Mark Yavornicky and Bernard Kersey	MIS, City of San Bernardino	14 July 2000
Sgt. R.C. Garcia	SBPD	16 Aug 2000 and 5 Sept 2000
Lt. Marco Grenado	SBPD MET	Jan thru Apr 2001
Capt. Jenifer Aragon and Lt. Steve Klettenberg	SBPD	23 Apr 2002
Lt. Roger Poyzer and Mike Eckley	SBPD	10 May 2002
Officer Eric Fyfie	SBPD	6 Sept 2002
Chief Garret W. Zimmon	SBPD	16 Dec 2002
Capt. Mark Emota	SBPD MET	16 Dec 2002
Officer Eric Fyfie	SBPD – phone conversations on multiple occasions	May 2002 thru Jan 2004

Table 4
Area Demographic Characteristics for Wave 1 and Wave 2
(Wave 1 n=797, Wave 2 n=1229)

	Area C-H		Area I-H		Area C-P		Area I-L		Area C-L		Totals	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Age												
18-24	35 (15.7%)	52 (16.3%)	48 (17.3%)	46 (12.0%)	16 (9.6%)	39 (12.7%)	9 (13.0%)	14 (13.5%)	1 (2.6%)	3 (3.0%)	100 (14.1%)	154 (12.7%)
25-34	67 (30.0%)	82 (25.7%)	74 (26.7%)	100 (26.2%)	52 (31.3%)	64 (20.8%)	13 (18.8%)	20 (19.2%)	7 (18.4%)	16 (16.0%)	213 (27.5%)	282 (23.3%)
35-44	69 (30.9%)	92 (28.8%)	70 (25.3%)	100 (26.2%)	38 (22.8%)	89 (29.0%)	15 (21.7%)	26 (25.0%)	11 (28.9%)	26 (26.0%)	203 (26.2%)	333 (27.5%)
45-54	24 (10.8%)	55 (17.2%)	37 (13.4%)	80 (20.9%)	19 (11.4%)	47 (15.3%)	8 (11.6%)	13 (12.5%)	8 (21.1%)	20 (20.0%)	96 (12.4%)	215 (17.7%)
55-64	15 (6.7%)	19 (6.0%)	16 (5.8%)	26 (6.8%)	10 (6.0%)	21 (6.8%)	8 (11.6%)	14 (13.5%)	3 (7.9%)	14 (14.0%)	52 (6.7%)	94 (7.8%)
65+	13 (5.8%)	19 (6.0%)	32 (11.6%)	30 (7.9%)	32 (19.2%)	47 (15.3%)	16 (23.2%)	17 (16.3%)	8 (21.1%)	21 (21.0%)	101 (13.0%)	134 (11.1%)
	223 (100%)	319 (100%)	277 (100%)	382 (100%)	167 (100%)	307 (100%)	69 (100%)	104 (100%)	38 (100%)	100 (100%)	774 (100%)	1212 (100%)
Gender												
Male	79 (36.1%)	120 (37.9%)	102 (36.3%)	133 (35.2%)	58 (34.9%)	112 (36.5%)	23 (33.8%)	35 (33.3%)	14 (35.0%)	34 (34.0%)	276 (35.7%)	434 (36.0%)
Female	140 (63.9%)	197 (62.1%)	179 (63.7%)	245 (64.8%)	108 (65.1%)	195 (63.5%)	45 (66.2%)	70 (66.7%)	26 (65.0%)	66 (66.0%)	498 (64.3%)	773 (64.0%)
	219 (100%)	317 (100%)	281 (100%)	378 (100%)	166 (100%)	307 (100%)	68 (100%)	105 (100%)	40 (100%)	100 (100%)	774 (100%)	1207 (100%)
Ethnicity												
Latino	137 (60.4%)	209 (64.9%)	205 (71.4%)	260 (67.7%)	124 (73.4%)	228 (73.1%)	51 (70.8%)	70 (65.4%)	30 (71.4%)	65 (62.5%)	547 (68.6%)	832 (67.7%)
Black	31 (13.7%)	53 (16.5%)	21 (7.3%)	51 (13.3%)	26 (15.4%)	44 (14.1%)	2 (2.8%)	23 (21.5%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.9%)	80 (10.0%)	159 (12.9%)
White	36 (15.9%)	30 (9.3%)	30 (10.5%)	43 (11.2%)	6 (3.6%)	18 (5.8%)	11 (15.3%)	8 (7.5%)	9 (21.4%)	25 (24.0%)	92 (11.5%)	139 (11.3%)
Other	23 (10.1%)	30 (9.3%)	31 (10.8%)	30 (7.8%)	13 (7.7%)	22 (7.1%)	8 (11.1%)	6 (5.6%)	3 (7.1%)	11 (10.6%)	78 (9.8%)	99 (8.1%)
	227 (100%)	322 (100%)	287 (100%)	384 (100%)	169 (100%)	312 (100%)	72 (100%)	107 (100%)	42 (100%)	104 (100%)	797 (100%)	1229 (100%)
HH income												
<\$10,000	48 (23.8%)	61 (20.5%)	58 (22.4%)	64 (18.0%)	34 (22.4%)	45 (15.6%)	7 (11.5%)	13 (13.1%)	1 (2.9%)	4 (4.2%)	148 (20.9%)	187 (16.5%)
\$10-19,000	71 (35.1%)	102 (34.3%)	103 (39.8%)	115 (32.3%)	45 (29.6%)	88 (30.4%)	19 (31.1%)	17 (17.2%)	13 (38.2%)	16 (16.8%)	251 (35.5%)	338 (29.8%)
\$20-29,000	47 (23.3%)	82 (27.6%)	43 (16.6%)	95 (26.7%)	42 (27.6%)	60 (22.1%)	7 (11.5%)	41 (41.1%)	5 (14.7%)	21 (22.1%)	144 (20.3%)	299 (26.3%)
\$30-45,000	21 (10.4%)	34 (11.4%)	41 (15.8%)	59 (16.6%)	24 (15.8%)	64 (22.1%)	16 (26.2%)	15 (15.2%)	11 (32.4%)	39 (41.1%)	113 (16.0%)	211 (18.6%)
>\$45,000	15 (7.4%)	18 (6.1%)	14 (5.4%)	23 (6.5%)	7 (4.6%)	32 (11.1%)	12 (19.7%)	13 (13.1%)	4 (11.8%)	15 (15.8%)	52 (7.3%)	101 (8.9%)
	202 (100%)	297 (100%)	259 (100%)	356 (100%)	152 (100%)	289 (100%)	61 (100%)	99 (100%)	34 (100%)	95 (100%)	708 (100%)	1136 (100%)
Education												
< HS grad	87 (39.9%)	147 (46.1%)	114 (40.9%)	148 (39.3%)	74 (44.8%)	120 (39.2%)	14 (20.6%)	34 (32.4%)	12 (30.8%)	25 (25.0%)	301 (39.1%)	47439.3%)
HS grad	57 (26.1%)	87 (27.3%)	79 (28.3%)	126 (33.4%)	51 (30.9%)	87 (28.4%)	17 (25.0%)	36 (34.3%)	8 (20.5%)	34 (34.0%)	212 (27.6%)	370 (30.7%)
Some coll	33 (15.1%)	46 (14.4%)	53 (19.0%)	49 (13.0%)	21 (12.7%)	56 (18.3%)	24 (35.3%)	23 (21.9%)	11 (28.2%)	30 (30.0%)	142 (18.5%)	204 (16.9%)
Coll grad	41 (18.8%)	39 (12.2%)	33 (11.8%)	54 (14.3%)	19 (11.5%)	43 (14.1%)	13 (19.1%)	12 (11.4%)	8 (20.5%)	11 (11.0%)	114 (14.8%)	159 (13.2%)
	218 (100%)	319 (100%)	279 (100%)	377 (100%)	165 (100%)	306 (100%)	68 (100%)	105 (100%)	39 (100%)	100 (100%)	769 (100%)	1207 (100%)
Tenure												
Renter	129 (60.6%)	211 (67.8%)	166 (62.6%)	239 (63.9%)	69 (44.5%)	120 (40.3%)	12 (18.2%)	41 (39.4%)	11 (28.2%)	16 (16.5%)	387 (52.4%)	627 (53.0%)
Owner	84 (39.4%)	100 (32.2%)	99 (37.4%)	135 (36.1%)	86 (55.5%)	178 (59.7%)	54 (81.8%)	63 (60.6%)	28 (71.8%)	81 (83.5%)	351 (47.6%)	557 (47.0%)
	213 (100%)	311 (100%)	265 (100%)	374 (100%)	155 (100%)	298 (100%)	66 (100%)	104 (100%)	39 (100%)	97 (100%)	738 (100%)	1184 (100%)
Time in area												
<2 yrs	79 (35.6%)	109 (34.2%)	97 (34.4%)	100 (26.0%)	46 (27.4%)	66 (21.4%)	11 (15.7%)	27 (25.2%)	8 (20.0%)	12 (11.8%)	241 (30.8%)	314 (25.7%)
2-5 yrs	67 (30.2%)	114 (35.7%)	67 (23.8%)	117 (30.5%)	24 (14.3%)	69 (22.3%)	7 (10.0%)	26 (24.3%)	8 (20.0%)	18 (17.6%)	173 (22.1%)	344 (28.2%)
6-10 yrs	29 (13.1%)	46 (14.4%)	31 (11.0%)	68 (17.7%)	17 (10.1%)	48 (15.5%)	8 (11.4%)	11 (10.3%)	4 (10.0%)	21 (20.6%)	89 (11.4%)	194 (15.9%)
>10 yrs	47 (21.2%)	50 (15.7%)	87 (30.9%)	99 (25.8%)	81 (48.2%)	126 (40.8%)	44 (62.9%)	43 (40.2%)	20 (50.0%)	51 (50.0%)	279 (35.7%)	369 (30.2%)
	222 (100%)	319 (100%)	282 (100%)	384 (100%)	168 (100%)	309 (100%)	70 (100%)	107 (100%)	40 (100%)	102 (100%)	782 (100%)	1221 (100%)
Time in USA												
<5 yrs	16 (7.2%)	33 (10.3%)	21 (7.5%)	30 (7.9%)	9 (5.4%)	25 (8.1%)	1 (1.4%)	3 (2.8%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (2.0%)	47 (6.0%)	93 (7.6%)
6-10 yrs	22 (9.9%)	26 (8.2%)	20 (7.1%)	37 (9.7%)	10 (6.0%)	27 (8.8%)	0 (0.0%)	5 (4.7%)	3 (7.5%)	2 (2.0%)	55 (7.0%)	97 (8.0%)
>10 yrs	184 (82.9%)	260 (81.5%)	239 (85.4%)	315 (82.5%)	149 (88.7%)	256 (83.1%)	71 (98.6%)	99 (92.5%)	37 (92.5%)	98 (96.1%)	680 (87.0%)	1028 (84.4%)
	222 (100%)	319 (100%)	280 (100%)	382 (100%)	168 (100%)	308 (100%)	72 (100%)	107 (100%)	40 (100%)	102 (100%)	782 (100%)	1218 (100%)

Note: Because of rounding, percentages will not always add up to one hundred.

Table 5
Area Demographic Characteristics
Comparing Percentages, Census 2000 to Wave 1

	Area C-H		Area I-H		Area C-P		Area I-L		Area C-L	
	Census	Wave 1	Census	Wave 1	Census	Wave 1	Census	Wave 1	Census	Wave 1
Age										
18-24	20.4%	15.7%	22.1%	17.3%	20.4%	9.6%	17.5%	13.0%	14.1%	2.6%
25-34	28.2%	30.0%	28.2%	26.7%	15.0%	31.1%	20.1%	18.8%	20.3%	18.4%
35-44	24.5%	30.9%	22.6%	25.3%	27.6%	22.8%	20.7%	21.7%	21.9%	28.9%
45-54	13.8%	10.8%	12.9%	13.4%	14.9%	11.4%	12.9%	11.6%	11.4%	21.1%
55-64	6.9%	6.7%	6.7%	5.8%	8.4%	6.0%	11.5%	11.6%	11.4%	7.9%
65+	6.2%	5.8%	7.3%	11.6%	13.3%	19.2%	17.3%	23.2%	20.9%	21.1%
	$X^2(5) = 6.343, ns$		$X^2(5) = 10.075, p<.05$		$X^2(5) = 38.812, p<.05$		$X^2(5) = 2.052, ns$		$X^2(5) = 7.164, p<.05$	
Gender										
Male	49.6%	36.1%	51.3%	36.3%	53.0%	34.9%	48.2%	33.8%	51.4%	35.0%
Female	50.4%	63.9%	48.7%	63.7%	47.0%	65.1%	51.8%	66.2%	48.6%	65.0%
	$X^2(1) = 14.044, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 23.839, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 20.324, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 5.193, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 3.969, p<.05$	
Education										
< HS grad	57.0%	40.4%	59.0%	41.4%	60.5%	45.0%	51.7%	21.1%	51.7%	27.8%
HS grad	29.2%	25.7%	23.6%	27.3%	22.1%	30.2%	26.7%	19.3%	26.7%	22.2%
Some coll	10.5%	12.6%	12.6%	17.6%	11.9%	13.4%	16.2%	36.8%	16.2%	30.6%
Coll grad	3.3%	21.3%	4.8%	13.7%	5.6%	11.4%	5.4%	22.8%	5.4%	19.4%
	$X^2(3) = 76.226, p<.05$		$X^2(3) = 44.684, p<.05$		$X^2(3) = 16.086, p<.05$		$X^2(3) = 42.741, p<.05$		$X^2(3) = 16.403, p<.05$	
Tenure										
Renter	77.5%	60.6%	70.1%	62.6%	53.3%	44.5%	27.1%	18.2%	26.6%	35.0%
Owner	22.5%	39.4%	29.9%	37.4%	46.7%	55.5%	72.9%	81.8%	73.4%	65.0%
	$X^2(1) = 20.059, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 5.657, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 3.774, ns$		$X^2(1) = 2.142, ns$		$X^2(1) = 1.034, ns$	
Time in area*										
5 yrs or less	77.3%	65.8%	63.2%	58.2%	47.4%	41.7%	55.2%	25.7%	55.2%	40.0%
> 5 yrs	22.7%	34.2%	36.8%	41.8%	52.6%	58.3%	44.8%	74.3%	44.8%	60.0%
	$X^2(1) = 9.876, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 2.418, ns$		$X^2(1) = 1.695, ns$		$X^2(1) = 18.310, p<.05$		$X^2(1) = 2.819, ns$	

* Census asks if respondent has moved within last 5 years, while study sample question asks how long respondent has lived in the neighborhood.

Note: Because of rounding, percentages will not always add up to one hundred.

Table 6
Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two High Disorder Areas
on the Immediate and Intermediate Outcomes

	Area I-H		Area C-H		STATISTICAL TESTS
	W1	W2	W1	W2	F-statistic
	n=287	n=384	n=227	n=322	
Immediate Outcomes					
See gang members hang out	2.86	2.53	2.88	2.90	F(1,1189)=4.38,p=.037
See police patrolling	3.23	3.19	3.55	3.13	F(1,1202)=6.08,p=.014
See new graffiti	2.54	2.44	2.95	2.67	ns
Intimidation by gang members	55%	47%	55%	61%	F(1,1194)=5.810, p=.016
Fear confrontation with gang member	2.11	1.99	2.04	2.33	F(1,1192)=10.32,p=.001
Intermediate Outcomes					
Fear of crime	2.14	2.03	2.17	2.28	F(1,1213)=5.16,p=.023
Perceived level of social disorder	2.35	2.17	2.52	2.46	ns
Any violent victimization (or attempted)	19%	23%	18%	29%	ns
Any property victimization (or attempted)	48%	52%	54%	59%	ns

Table 7
Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two Low Disorder Areas
on the Immediate and Intermediate Outcomes

	Area I-L		Area C-L		STATISTICAL TESTS
	W1	W2	W1	W2	F-statistic
Immediate Outcomes	n=72	n=107	n=42	n=104	
See gang members hang out	1.72	2.06	1.73	1.51	F(1,315)=5.97,p=.015
See police patrolling	3.24	3.24	3.45	2.71	F(1,319)=5.94,p=.015
See new graffiti	2.11	2.23	1.82	1.62	ns
Intimidation by gang members	38%	42%	41%	26%	ns
Fear confrontation with gang member	1.49	1.71	1.28	1.38	ns
<u>Intermediate Outcomes</u>					
Fear of crime	1.62	1.88	1.58	1.58	ns
Perceived level of social disorder	1.75	2.06	1.63	1.61	F(1,321)=4.44,p=.036
Any violent victimization (or attempted)	6%	23%	2%	8%	ns
Any property victimization (or attempted)	28%	43%	36%	25%	F(1,318)=5.58, p=.019

Table 8
Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two High Disorder Areas
on the Long-term Outcomes

	Area I-H		Area C-H		STATISTICAL TESTS
	W1	W2	W1	W2	F-statistic
Long Term Outcomes	n=287	n=384	n=227	n=322	
Social cohesion	2.95	3.04	2.84	2.80	ns
Informal social control	3.01	3.06	2.98	2.95	ns
Collective efficacy	2.98	3.05	2.91	2.87	ns
Belief neighborhood can solve problems	2.78	2.91	2.77	2.75	ns
Willing to call police if a gang member threatens	3.76	3.91	3.67	4.05	ns
Trust police	3.42	3.41	3.41	3.28	ns

Table 9
Means and Tests of Area by Wave Interactions in Two Low Disorder Areas
on the Long-term Outcomes

	Area I-L		Area C-L		STATISTICAL TESTS
	W1	W2	W1	W2	F-statistic
Long Term Outcomes	n=72	n=107	n=42	n=104	
Social cohesion	3.36	3.24	3.50	3.40	ns
Informal social control	4.04	4.22	4.31	4.35	ns
Collective efficacy	3.43	3.32	3.46	3.47	ns
Belief neighborhood can solve problems	3.29	3.11	3.25	3.59	F(1,315)=4.28,p=.039
Willing to call police if gang member threatens	3.50	3.39	3.41	3.54	ns
Trust police	3.61	3.59	3.45	3.64	ns

Table 10
Means and Tests by Area Comparing Two High Disorder Injunction Areas
on Wave 2 Proximal Outcomes

	Area I-H W2	Area C-P W2	STATISTICAL TESTS t-test or Chi square
	n=384	n=312	
<u>Immediate Outcomes</u>			
See gang members hang out	2.53	2.49	ns
See police patrolling	3.19	3.04	ns
See new graffiti	2.44	2.40	ns
Intimidation by gang members	47%	52%	ns
Fear confrontation with gang member	1.99	2.10	ns
<u>Intermediate Outcomes</u>			
Fear of crime	2.03	2.04	ns
Perceived level of social disorder	2.17	2.24	ns
Any violent victimization (or attempted)	23%	20%	ns
Any property victimization (or attempted)	52%	42%	$X^2(1)=7.687, p=.006$

Table 11
Means and Tests by Area Comparing Two High Disorder Injunction Areas
on Wave 2 Distal Outcomes

	Area I-H W2	Area C-P W2	STATISTICAL TESTS t-test or Chi square
Long Term Outcomes	n=384	n=312	
Social cohesion	3.04	3.16	$t(606)^1=2.132, p=.033$
Informal social control	3.06	3.20	ns
Collective efficacy	3.05	3.18	$t(622)^1=2.329, p=.020$
Belief neighborhood can solve problems	2.91	3.12	$t(620)^1=2.611, p=.009$
Willing to call police if a gang member threatens	3.91	4.16	$t(688)=2.813, p=.005$
Trust police	3.41	3.46	ns

¹ df adjusted for test with unequal variances


Table 12
 Percent of R Who See a Change in Gang Activity NOW Relative to One Year
 BEFORE the Wave 2 Interview

	Area I-H	Area C-H	Area C-P	X ² test across areas	Area I-L	Area C-L	X ² test across areas
	n=371	n=312	n=300		n=102	n=99	
More activity	14%	24%	12%	X ² (4) =19.18, p=.001	7%	8%	ns
Same	54%	49%	52%		72%	66%	
Less Activity	32%	27%	36%		22%	26%	


Table 13
Mean Agreement That a Gang Injunction Is a Good Way
to Make Neighborhoods Safer

	Area I-H	Area C-H	Area C-P	X ² test across areas	Area I-L	Area C-L	X ² test across areas
	n=379	n=315	n=305		n=102	n=97	
% who agree injunctions are a good way to make neighborhoods safer	77%	75%	81%	ns	82%	86%	ns
% who feel injunctions go too far, are unfair to gang members	15%	15%	14%	ns	8%	12%	ns

Five Study Areas of San Bernardino study



Location of Contacts with Individuals Cited in SBPD Declarations
in Flats Civil Gang Injunction,
Injunction Boundaries and Study Areas



City of San Bernardino in relation to California and other cities



Figure 1
Proportion of Achieved Sample Surveyed Face-to-Face Each Survey Wave by Area




Figure 2
Frequency of Seeing Gang Members Hanging Out
in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months




Figure 3
Frequency of Seeing Police Officers Patrolling
in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months




Figure 4
Frequency of Seeing New Graffiti
in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months




Figure 5
 Percent of R Who Were Intimidated (Bullied, Hassled, Frightened, Made Anxious) by Gang Members
 in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months




Figure 6
 Level of Fear of Being Confronted by a Gang Member
 in the Neighborhood over the Last Six Months




Figure 8
Perceived Social Disorder over the Last Six Months in the Neighborhood
(Average Frequency of 12 Items)




Figure 9
 Percent of R or Family Members Who Were Victims of Violent Crime (or Attempted)
 in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months




Figure 10
 Percent of R or Family Members Who Were Victims of Property Crime
 (or Attempted) in the Neighborhood in the Last Six Months





Figure 11
 Perceived Change in the Level of Gang Activities
 in the Neighborhood NOW Relative to this Same Time a Year BEFORE (Wave 2 Interview)



FEARGANG		VICTV_NY		
WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	
	2.0	2.3	18%	29%
	2.1	2.0	19%	23%
	1.9	2.1	15%	20%
	1.5	1.7	6%	23%
	1.3	1.4	2%	8%

S_dis2		s_cohex	
WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
2.520109989	2.455451264	Area C-H	2.836283 2.79621
2.34990623	2.172647095	Area I-H	2.958246 3.038307
2.267938312	2.237497207	Area C-P	3.141317 3.158065
1.74879349	2.063953959	Area I-L	3.358565 3.235849
1.626803752	1.613701923	Area C-L	3.5 3.40008

n_effic	
WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	2.773333 2.757188
Area I-H	2.777385 2.910995
Area C-P	2.837349 3.12459
Area I-L	3.291667 3.115385
Area C-L	3.25 3.592233

ggraff	
WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	2.951 2.671
Area I-H	2.541 2.444
Area C-P	2.461 2.399
Area I-L	2.111 2.235
Area C-L	1.825 1.621

AREA_FIN	G_HANG		GNGINTIM	
	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	2.882882883	2.898089172	1.668161435	1.858175605
Area I-H	2.864285714	2.531830239	1.629464286	1.566798942
Area C-P	2.652439024	2.493485342	1.659552846	1.613172043
Area I-L	1.722222222	2.0625	1.260416667	1.441269841
Area C-L	1.731707317	1.509803922	1.333333333	1.197411003

	C_PATROL		
	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	
Area C-H	3.551111111	3.133956386	Area C-H
Area I-H	3.227758007	3.188654354	Area I-H
Area C-P	3.293413174	3.041935484	Area C-P
Area I-L	3.236111111	3.242857143	Area I-L
Area C-L	3.452380952	2.711538462	Area C-L

AREA_FIN	INTIM_NY	
	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	55%	61%
Area I-H	55%	47%
Area C-P	56%	53%
Area I-L	38%	42%
Area C-L	41%	26%

Percent who see decrease ingang activities

	% see decrease	%same	% see increase		
C-HIGH	27%	49%	24%		1
INJ -HIGH	32%	54%	14%		1
C-PRIOR	36%	52%	12%		1
INJ -LOW	22%	71%	7%		1
C-LOW	26%	66%	8%		1

Percent who see decrease ingang activities

	% Increase	% Same	% Decrease		
Area C-H	24%	49%	27%		1
Area I-H	14%	54%	32%		1
Area C-P	12%	52%	36%		1
Area I-L	7%	71%	22%		1
Area C-L	8%	66%	26%		1

3. FINAL REPORT AREAS * WAVE

Dependent Variable: M01

FINAL REF Mean

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	0.348018	0.531056
Area I-H	0.320557	0.466146
Area C-P	0.284024	0.419872
Area I-L	0.305556	0.439252
Area C-L	0.333333	0.307692

VICTP_NY

AREA	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	54%	59%
Area I-H	48%	52%
Area C-P	43%	42%
Area I-L	28%	44%
Area C-L	36%	25%

FEARNOG

AREA	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	2.1644	2.2773
Area I-H	2.1390	2.0318
Area C-P	1.9301	2.0438
Area I-L	1.6215	1.8793
Area C-L	1.5813	1.5801

CALLGANG

AREA	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	3.674	4.047
Area I-H	3.757	3.908
Area C-P	3.909	4.155
Area I-L	4.042	4.219
Area C-L	4.310	4.350

SAMPX

AREA	WAVE 1	WAVE 2
Area C-H	2.9113	2.8710
Area I-H	2.9847	3.0480
Area C-P	3.1329	3.1816
Area I-L	3.4293	3.3193
Area C-L	3.4573	3.4711